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ABSTRACT
FROM OLD TO NEW:
A THIRD WAY OR THE END OF ALTERNATIVE POLITICS? 
THE CASE OF TFIE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY
Ü9karde$ler, Emre
MA., Department o f Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Lauren McLaren
August 1999
This thesis critically analyses the ideological transformation o f the 
British Labour Party. Following an investigation o f the nature and basic 
dimensions of party’s conventional ideology, the main focus will be on the 
fundamental transformation that occurred in the mid 1990s under the leadership o f 
Tony Blair. The thesis argues that contemporary Labour Party does not offer a 
political vision beyond the new-right, rather its electoral success lies in its 
reconciliation with the basics of Thatcherism in an era when the Conseiwative Party 
lost its popularity.
Keywords: The Labour Party, Tony Blair, Thatcherism, Social Democracy, 
Supply-side Economics, The Third Way, Ideology, Welfare.
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ÖZET
ESKİDEN YENİYE:
ÜÇÜNCÜ BİR YOL MU ALTERNATİF SİYASETİN SONU MU? 
İNGİLİZ İŞÇİ PARTİSİ ÖRNEĞİ
Üçkardeşler, Emre
MA., Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Lauren McLaren
Eylül 1999
Bu çalışma İngiliz İşçi Partisinin ideoljik dönüşümü eleştirisel bir 
gözle incelemektedir. Partinin geleneksel ideolojisinin doğası ve temel boyutlarının 
kısa bir analizini takiben, partide 19901ı yıllarda, özellikle de Tony Blair 
döneminde, gerçekleştirilen kökten dönüşüm ayrıntılı olarak İncelenmektedir. Bu 
çalışmaya göre yeni İşçi Partisi yeni-sağ politikaların ötesinde bir siyasi perspektif 
sunmamakta, aksine seçim başarısı. Muhafazakar Partinin popülaritesinin azaldığı 
bir dönemde, partinin yeni-sağ siyaset ile uzlaşmasında yatmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: İşçi Partisi, Tony Blair, Thatchcrism, Sosyal Demokrasi, Arz- 
yanlı İktisat, Üçüncü Yol, İdeoloji, Refah Devleti.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Looking at the Western European political map, what we first see is 
that almost all Western Europe, except Spain and Ireland, is governed by political 
parties which refer to themselves as being somehow on the left of the political 
spectrum. This process, if we can call it such, began in 1995 with the Finnish 
elections, and triumphed with the victoiy o f the Gemían Social Democrat-Green 
coalition in 1998. In this respect, thel997 British elections were o f considerable 
importance since they meant the end o f the 18 years-long conservative government 
which had become the champion of the neo-liberal policies for almost two decades.
Nevertheless, there is also another dimension of this phenomenon. 
A decade ago, some were burying the left with slogans such as the death of 
socialism and the end of history, and now some are hotly welcoming the revival o f 
the left. Having observed the fact that most of those who were in the funeral are 
now in the birthday party, one can not help but think that there should be 
something worth investigating in this. For several generations in Europe, it was 
apparently unusual, rather unimaginable, to see, for example a commentary titled
’The New Left Could Save the Market’ in the Wall Street Journal 
(21/December/1998); the declaration o f the tabloid the Sun that it backs the Labour 
Party, or the decision of the billionaire press baron, Lord Rothermere who is the 
proprietor o f the Daily Mail, to abandon the Conservative benches in the House o f 
Lords in favour of Labour’s (The Guardian, 23/May/1997).
Considering such a landscape, the first question we posed became 
how did the left succeeding in gaining such an acceptance o f those who were 
strongly identified with the right. In other words, with what kind of political 
projects could the European left have been carried to the ranks o f the government? 
Therefore, our original intention was to provide an analysis o f the contemporary 
situation at the European level. However, immediately we realised that neither was 
it so easy to evaluate different contemporary cases in a single basket, nor was it 
meaningful to analyse the present cases without an investigation o f the left in the 
course o f the twentieth century. In other words, in a limited study, we had to make 
a choice between the width and the depth, one at the expense of the other. Since we 
thought that it would be more intelligible dealing with a single case within its 
historicity, we decided to deal with the British Labour Party. The reasons for 
choosing it are clear. First, it is coming out o f a tradition aged almost 100 years, 
through which we can observe both the nature o f its own project and also various 
ideological debates and transformations that took place within it. Second, as stated 
above, Britain had experienced the harshest neo-liberal rule for two decades, which 
deeply affected the political orientations, both at the popular level or at the party 
level. Third, in Europe and elsewhere the discussion on ‘the new left’ revolver;
around British Labour’s success story and its foundations. Therefore, we saw the 
British Labour Party as the best case in which to analyse the nature, transformation 
and the final condition o f the twentieth century social democratic and/or democratic 
socialist movement in a single country. Now, let us introduce the study.
The purpose o f the second chapter is to provide a brief but 
substantial investigation o f the history o f the Labour party from its foundation up 
through the 1983 election defeat which marks the beginning o f the ideological 
transformation of the party under the leadership o f Neil Kinnock. The Old Labour 
Party used to be defined as a ‘broad church’ in British politics. Having been 
founded as a mixture o f the trade union movement and various socialist groups, 
within a relatively short time it created its own ideology and succeeded in 
replacing the Liberal Party as one of the two greatest parties in Britain.' Indeed, in 
many cases, it shared a lot o f common ideas and ideals with the liberals, but it was 
distinguished from them with its emphasis on class politics.
Of course, this ‘broad church’ was not an always-happy assembly 
and in the course o f time, the Labour Party had experienced significant ideological 
debates raised by various factions of the party. The meaning and the relevance (or 
irrelevance) o f public ownership, which was the core o f the revisionist argument in 
the 1960s, was the most prominent one. However, no matter how diversified within 
itself, an associated concern had always existed among the ideological factions o f  
the Labour Party. At the heart o f this concern was the belief that capitalism, due to 
its nature, is an anti-humanitarian system which inevitably brings (and relies on)
It was again this party which founded the post-war welfare state and economy in Britain.
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inequality and social injustice between the classes. However, since the Party 
carefully rejects a revolutionary line, what needed to be done was to attempt the 
realisation o f socialist and egalitarian goals within capitalism. What made social 
democrat (or democratic socialist) parties social democrat was this line o f thought 
and the ideological debate, some o f which we will see in the second chapter, for 
several decades occurred beyond this belief, not about it. Neither Bemsteinian 
revisionism o f the German left which was formulated in the late nineteenth century, 
and found its ultimate expression in the Bad Godesberg program in 1959, nor the 
Croslandite revisionism o f the British left in the 1960s, were exempt from this. And 
although, for a variety o f reasons, some o f which we agree to, many Marxists, 
including Marx himself, strongly denounced this line o f thought; it was, according 
to us, undeniably important and helpful in the popular promotion o f left-wing 
politics in the course of the twentieth century. To sum up, the second chapter 
provides the. historical evolution of twentieth century British parliamentary left 
embodied in the Labour Party. It is this social democratic project which began to 
disappear with the coming o f Kiimock to the leadership following the electoral 
defeat o f Labour in 1983.
The third chapter deals with the era o f two leaders: Neil Kinnock 
(1983-1992) and John Smith (1992-1994). Kinnock can be said to prepare much o f  
the ground for the fundamental transformation o f the party by Blair. He moved to 
create a party in which the power of the leadership is not curbed by the grass-roots 
or party activists. He also started the process o f abandoning the former priorities o f 
Labour, the Policy Review, through an accommodation with the priorities o f the
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neo-liberal settlement. Smith did not become a second Kinnock and tried to 
transform party in a gradual way without kicking activists or radicals. But this did 
not mean that he was strongly committed to keep Labour in the social democratic 
tradition. Further, under his leadership we can see some origins o f the mode o f  
thought on economic policy and welfare, which would be highly maturated in New  
Labour.
The fourth chapter is the heart o f this study. In this chapter, the 
reader will find a detailed investigation o f the formation and policies o f New  
Labour. An important section is devoted to the economic policy o f New Labour 
which, according to us, means nothing more than a modified version o f neo-liberal 
economics and free market triumphalism. What New Labour seeks to add to this 
agenda is its argument for having the magic formulation for the fair and proper 
functioning o f the free markets in which, with the ‘help’ o f the state, everybody 
could win. We will also try to show both the irrelevance o f such an agenda to even 
the modest aspirations of the left, i.e. conventional social democracy, and the 
unfeasibility of this project in order to realise what it promises since it defines its 
room o f action mostly within the boundaries o f neo-liberal economics. In this 
chapter the reader will also find our attempt to explain the phenomena o f New  
Labour in terms o f the political economy o f Britain under Thatcherism.
There are two other topics o f the fourth chapter. First, the social 
conservatism o f New Labour, which, for the first time in the party history, a 
number o f topics originally belonging to the Anglo-Saxon conservative thought are 
being promoted by the Labour Party. Second, new welfare understanding and
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policy o f New Labour which is formulated in tune with its economic policy. Two 
points should be stated here. First, New Labour’s understanding o f welfare is quite 
different from Old Labour’s. It declares the end o f universal welfare provision on 
the basis o f need, and introduces another concept o f ‘welfare to work’. Second, 
what is aimed at ‘welfare to work’ again does not seem feasible since New  
Labour’s supply-side policies are blind to the demand side o f the economy and 
budget constraints makes it difficult to realise. Beyond this, since the underlying 
agenda o f welfare to work, in the sense promoted by New Labour, is to guarantee 
the flow o f cheap labour to flexible labour markets, it does not introduce a new 
agenda beyond the workfare.
The fifth chapter is a short chapter introducing the reader to the 
ongoing debate around the The Third Way theme. We will also briefly discuss 
some ideational underpinnings o f the Third Way mostly on the basis o f what Tony 
Blair and Anthony Giddens wrote on this issue.
This study, it must be said, is written from a left-wing perspective 
which is neither ‘Old Labour’ nor ‘New Labour’. Of course, as it was probably 
recognised, this is not to say that it is equidistant to both. Although it had a large set 
of criticisms to Old Labour too, it would acknowledge its role in constituting the 
most powerful -and the only popular one entering into Parliament- line o f class 
politics -whether successful or not when in power- in Britain. Meanwhile, what it 
expects from a contemporary social democrat party is not to give an end to 
capitalism which had actually never been in the agenda o f social democracy. 
Rather, what would be expected from a party that claims to be a renewed social
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democrat is first, instead o f reproducing the conservative economics, to attempt at 
the articulation o f an economic policy which can combine the aspirations o f social 
democracy - basically a fair distribution and socio-economic justice - with an 
intelligible economic policy which does not surrender to neo-liberal myths on 
stability and public spending and globalisation. Second, as stated by Yalman in a 
recent article, we would expect a social democratic party, to let the social classes to 
take place as organised autonomous groups in democratic political competition 
(Yalman, 1999). However, as this study will try to illustrate. New Labour has 
nothing to do with them.
As a final note, although we would like to deal with the Labour 
Party and basically New Labour in the widest sense, the limits o f this study 
prevented us from examining the constitutional policy o f New Labour, such as 
devolution, a written constitution, hereditary peers, local government etc. On the 
one hand these are the only matters in which New Labour appears to be different 
from the Tories. For example the Scottish Parliament, which the Tories are strictly 
against, has already been realised. However, on some vital issues directly related to 
démocratisation of the British state, such as empowerment o f local govermnent. 
New Labour is quite unwilling to move. Moreover, when one considers the 
centralist tendencies o f the Labour government, for example disempowemment o f  
local education authorities in favour of the education department, and the social 
conservatism o f New Labour, which will be examined in this study, discourse on 
the constitutional reform looses its meaning since at the heart o f the idea o f
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constitutional reform lies the démocratisation and decentralisation o f the British 
state.
In a similar vein, it would be interesting to examine the international 
aggressiveness, and warfare budget (Edgerton, 1997) o f this so-called left 
government which did not hesitate to sell arms to the authoritarian government o f  
Indonesia (The Guardian, 21/June/1999). However, these issues had to remain 
untouched due to the limited nature o f this study.
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CHAPTER II
OLD LABOUR
2.1 Roots
It was in 1900 when a set of trade unions together with Independent 
Labour Party (ILP), Social Democratic Federation (SDF) and Fabian Society 
established the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) in order to realise labour 
representation in British Parliament (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 2). Among the 
constituting elements, the Fabian society, founded in 1884, was devoted to social 
analysis and policy making in the service o f collectivist values, and was defining 
socialism as the ‘economic side of the democracy’. It was seeking reforms 
designed to register, inspect, and control the private economy (Callaghan, 1989: 
24).
Independent Labour Party (ILP), another founder, was formed in 
1893 with the aim of sending workers to Parliament independent o f Liberal and 
Conservative Parties. It was seeking to draw strength from workers, socialists and 
liberals who were disappointed with the record o f the Liberal Party. It had adopted 
a socialist constitution in the collectivist sense o f the word, but some o f its
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founding elements like Scottish Labour Party had cautiously avoided such an 
identification. The party itself also had rejected the title ‘socialist’ since it would be 
disapproved by the electorate or the trade unions (Sassoon, 1996: 16).
Notwithstanding this, the largest intellectual group in the ILP was 
those who were called ethical socialists who were deeply influenced by the radical- 
liberal tradition and wished to maintain and extend the gains o f Gladstonian 
Liberalism in the areas o f political democracy and popular self organisation. They 
focused on the cultural and ethical criticisms o f commercial society and free 
market (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 3). However, with the foundation o f LRC in 1900, 
the ethical socialists moved from the margins o f British politics into a more 
‘political’ role as a ginger group within the daily politics with prospects o f political 
representation at the national level (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 3-4). Thanks to their 
influence, the moralistic critic of the corruption and degradation o f a competitive 
society was to be at the heart of British socialism during the twentieth century 
(Foote, 1997: 38).
Both Fabians and the ILP rejected the Marxist theory o f class 
struggle and believed the realisation of a socialism which could be built by 
modifying existing parliamentary institutions and through peaceful and democratic 
reforms (Callaghan, 1989: 23). The idea that the state was simply an instrument for 
the suppression o f the working class was totally alien to them. Rather, they 
favoured the view that ‘ the state is simply an instrument’ and it can be used 
variously in the hands o f various people (Callaghan, 1989:24; Foote, 1997:41). The 
only founding part that had a more or less Marxist tone in the LRC was the Social
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Democratic Federation. The major group in the Federation consisted o f those who 
were called state socialists who, unlike Fabians or ILP, had shifted the focus o f  
their analysis away from the political arrangements and ethical choices towards the 
structural aspects o f capitalist state and economy together with a revolutionary 
strategy oriented to demolish capitalism (Felling and Reid, 1996:4). However, 
within the LRC, they could not attract much enthusiasm.
Therefore, within the foundation o f the LRC in 1900, what 
occurred was an alliance between trade unions trying to be more active in 
defending their interests in daily politics, and a number o f different socialist 
groups seeking to have a more powerful place in politics. The party was basically 
an extension o f trade unions and was financially and organisationally dependent on 
them. This relation was crucial and, in Geoffrey Foote’s words, it was what made 
the Labour Party a labour party (Foote, 1997: 7). Thus, the dominant ideology in 
the new party became what would be called labourism, a mixture o f trade union 
politics and liberal and socialist reformism oriented towards the creation o f a just 
and egalitarian society (Callaghan, 1989: 25).
Considering the Party in terms o f the new alliance mentioned 
above, the early Labour Party, unlike continental democratic socialist and social 
democrat parties, was primarily a party of interests rather than ideas (Shaw, 1996: 
3). It did not have a precise, and coherently worked-out ideology to guide its 
actions. However, togetherness o f all those elements under labourist assumptions 
gave rise to a new ideology which some call corporate socialism. An earlier 
formulation o f this ideology would be manifested in the party’s 1918 constitution.
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It was a particular brand o f socialism in which working class politics were fused 
with the Fabianist, Ethical Socialist and Marxist ideas and ideals (Foote, 
1997:18).
Fundamental to the establishment o f Labour socialism were three 
activists. First, Sidney Webb was a leading Fabian figure influential in the 
ideological foundation o f labourism. Second, Arthur Anderson and third, Ramsay 
MacDonald both o f whom were vital in the organisation and popularisation o f the 
party at the national level. Keir Hardie should also be counted since he contributed 
to the ideological formation o f the party by drawing the contours o f British 
Socialism by putting an emphasis on working class politics, thus ideologically 
separated it from the Liberal Party ( Foote, 1997: 44-46).
It was just after the First World War when Labour implemented 
significant constitutional changes. The effect o f the war throughout the country was 
clear. It had forced the State to be organised through collectivist lines in the sense 
favoured by the Fabians (Foote, 1997:70). The Liberal Party had disintegrated and 
Labour had entered the wartime coalition. Its status was transformed from a 
pressure group to a candidate for government. Immediately, Labour adopted a new 
constitution in February 1918. With this constitution. Labour became a much more 
centralised party in terms of administration with individual membership through 
constituency parties all around the Britain (Foote, 1997: 70). Nevertheless, the 
main point o f the Constitution was the official adoption of socialist goals. The 
famous Clause 7F became their embodiment:
19
To secure for the producers by hand or by brain the 
full fruits of their industry, and the most equitable 
distribution thereof that may be possible, upon the 
basis o f the common ownership o f the means o f  
production and the best obtainable system of popular 
administration and control of each industry or 
service.
With the new Constitution and Clause IV, Labour succeeded to link
labourism and socialism as complementary and interdependent sets of ideas.
However, neither these developments, nor the labourist goals o f the Party should
lead us to conclude that Labour stood only for the workers. To the leading figures
of the party, while the working class would be its prime beneficiaries and provide
much o f its electoral ballast, socialism would also mean the ‘enlightened
consciousness of society as a whole’ which finds its expression ‘not through the
material striving of working class but through the rational capacity o f political and
administrative leaders’ (Pierson, 1973: 123 quoted in Shaw, 1996: 4). A less
frequently quoted but again important restatement o f the general aims in the
Constitution o f 1918 also reveals this point:
Generally to promote the Political, Social, and 
Economic Emancipation o f the People, and more 
particularly of those who depend directly upon their 
own exertions by hand or by brain for the means of 
life.
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Although the new constitution had been a decisive step in Labour’s 
history, political radicalism o f the party was limited because what Labour defined 
as socialist politics was a model that recognises the existence o f classes but 
carefully avoids the class struggle, advocates the primacy and adequacy o f 
parliamentary action for the realisation of socialism, and hence, eludes a 
revolutionary project. The socialist overtone of the party was in its emphasis on 
public ownership, nationalisation, state intervention and central plarming as the 
essential means for the creation o f a just and egalitarian society.
Within the decade after the war. Labour’s rise was almost 
unstoppable. Two developments eased this rise. First, the wartime split in the ranks 
of the Liberals could not been remedied. Second, in 1918, universal male suffi'age 
was granted. Having benefited from these two, in 1922 Labour doubled its vote, 
and in 1924, it ruled as a minority government. The Labour government could 
survive only for a few months, and its only legislative success became the 
Wheatley Housing Act. (Shaw, 1996; 7). Nevertheless, finally in 1929, Labour, by 
winning eight and a half million votes, became the largest party in the House o f  
Commons. Still lacking the majority, it could form again a minority government 
with the help of Liberal votes.
Unfortunately, this was the beginning o f a disaster for Labour. The 
Great Depression was sweeping the economies o f the world, and Labour was quite 
unsuccessful in either understanding the condition or taking the necessary 
measures. In Britain the number o f people out o f work rose rapidly from about a 
million to near three million. This was a horrible record for a party whose main
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point was to protect the interests o f the working people. Indeed, Labour’s capacity 
to act effectively and responsively was not totally broken since it still could rely on 
the support o f the liberals (Shaw, 1996: 7). However, the real problem was lying 
somewhere else: the MacDonald government had no actual strategy to deal with 
the depression. Even worse, the above-all concern o f MacDonald was to show the 
moderateness o f Labour in order not to frighten off the voters. Snowden, the iron 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, was unquestionably committed to the orders o f the 
financial orthodoxy of the day, free trade and a strong pound, (Davies, 1995: 130; 
Shaw, 1996: 8). Having deeply failed to cope with the crisis. Labour leaders first 
moved to form a coalition government with liberals, then in the subsequent election 
Labour fell in the opposition ranks (Felling and Reid, 1996: 62).
There were serious lessons to be drawn from this experience. First, 
Labour was strictly suffering from the lack o f a coherent and precise economic 
theory to determine the party policy. Second, it was too obsessed with displaying 
moderateness, hence it was unable to take initiative in government. These two 
points also give us some clues in evaluating the failures o f divergent left-wing 
governments either in Britain or elsewhere in the word: In most cases, they neither 
achieved (even not attempted to) any transformation o f their states or societies nor 
succeeded to steer the capitalist state and economy they had inherited. Therefore, in 
many cases one should not be surprised by the long-lasting conservative 
governments that succeeded failed left-wing governments.
The failure o f the Labour government placed a strong case in favour 
of the radical members o f the party since their critique to gradualism and moderate
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reformism had been justified. Support for radical politics were increasing not only 
in unions arid Labour, but also in British society. Davies writes that although 
before 1931 Marxism had been a negligible force in British life, after the collapse 
of the MacDonald administration in 1931, it became almost fashionable (Davies, 
1996: 167). Even the idea to form a separate Marxist Labour party based on the 
class war and unadulterated socialism came into the agenda. Fenner Brockway in 
The Coming Revolution (1932), invited workers to break with the gradualism o f the 
Labour Party and trade union bureaucracy who had vested interests in this 
gradualism (Foote, 1997; 146). According to R.H. Tawney (1932), what was seen 
under MacDonald’s government was the reflection o f a weakness o f political 
philosophy- an indecisive conception of what sort o f society Labour wanted. 
Tawney’s offer was based on the ‘abolishment o f all advantages and disabilities 
rooted not in the differences o f personal quality, but in disparities o f wealth, 
opportunity, social position and economic power’ (Foote, 1997: 147). In a similar 
vein, Cripps and Laski, in a Marxist tone, analysing the matter in terms o f class 
struggle, and repression, distanced themselves from the dominant view o f ‘the 
state as a neutral instrument’, (Foote, 1997:148); and came to conclude the 
impossibility o f socialism by constitutional means (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 140). 
Cripps demanded that ‘the whole financial machinery’ o f Britain should be taken 
over by the public (Davies, 1996:170).
However, post-Depression developments within Labour was 
evolving not only towards Marxian or revolutionary echalons, but also towards 
the adoption o f what is called corporate socialism whose basic grounds were
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public ownership, planning, (recently developed) Keynesian economics and the 
notion o f welfare. The main intellectual figure behind the idea of public ownership 
and nationalisation was Herbert Morrison. At this time, a set of theorists whomt 
Geoffrey Foote refers to as The Labour Keynesians, were affective in the formation 
of the party’s economic policy. The most important ones were Mosley, Evan 
Durbin, Hugh Dalton, Ernest Bevin, and G.D.H. COLE. (Foote, 1997: 159-174). 
They were, in varying degrees influenced from Keynesian economics which was 
welcomed as an assault to laissez-faire economics, and empowered the belief in 
the capacity o f the state for achieving the goals o f the party.
Finally, Labour had a more or less complete stance with its own 
values and policy prospects within British politics. Within this mixture, if  
Keynesian economics was a contribution to the ideological cement o f Labour from 
liberalism, syndicalism, not in its revolutionist forms but in the corporatist strain o f 
functional representation (of interest groups) as advocated by Guild Socialists, and 
various branches o f socialist ideology, were the contributions from the left (Foote, 
1997: 171-182). Of course these contributors could not be expected to be in a an 
continues peace and harmony, but they constituted a set of common goals and a 
route for the party; and this party was to transform British politics in the mid 
1940s.
2.2 Politics of Consensus
Although between 1940 and 1945 the wartime coalition in power 
was led by conservatives, in the mood of the mid-1940s, Labour was actually
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only party likely to win a majority in the Parliament. Donald Sassoon describes this 
mood as, ‘the egalitarian ethos o f the war, the solidaristic feelings enhanced by 
having to face a common enemy, the prestige o f the USSR, the failures o f  
conservatives to stop Hitler before 1939, the memories o f the Depression of the 
1930s, the readier recognition o f the need to change’ (Sassoon, 1996: 118). Indeed 
the situation was almost all the same throughout Western Europe which was 
seeking to remedy the destructive effects of the war. Soon after the war, in Britain, 
Sweden and Norway, social democrat and socialist parties were in charge, while in 
the rest o f the Europe they took part in coalition governments (Sassoon, 1996; 
122). Although, even conservatives were not advocating a complete counter 
(laisser-fairre) prospect at this time, leftist parties in general, and Labour in Britain 
were favoured with the belief that they could do better than conservatives would 
do. Sassoon adds that, ‘the conservatives would probably have built a welfare state, 
but it would have [simply] been based on the extension o f the widely criticised pre­
war social services and public assistance. They would not have accepted the 
principle of a citizen’s universal right o f access to services o f an equal standard 
regardless of income’ (Sassoon, 1996: 141).
The Labour government led by Attlee stayed in charge until 1951. It 
was the most successful Labour government ever, and did powerfully lay the 
foundations o f Britain’s social and economic policy for the next thirty years. The 
Labour administration meant a step toward nationalisation, social service provision 
tlirough Welfare state practices, and economic and industrial planning (Gamer and 
Kelly, 1993: 140). The Party was not militant on the issue o f nationalisation, but, it
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must be said, it was convincingly successful. Nationalisation o f coal and railways 
around the theme o f national interest, and nationalisation o f what was identified 
(as) natural monopolies such as electricity and gas did not become a matter o f big 
dispute between the parties sharing the same mood (Callaghan, 1989; 29, Tivey, 
1989; 132). Labour had added Bank o f England, telecommunication, and civil 
aviation to the list, and nationalised them too (Sassoon, 1996; 152). The erai 
between 1945-1979 is often described -sometimes with exaggeration- as that o f  
consensus politics in Britain -and in Europe- since most o f government policie.'; 
more or less revolved around the themes o f mixed economy, planning, full 
employment and an interventionist welfare state through corporatist ties (Coxal- 
and Robins, 1998; 50). When it departed office. Labour left a Britain which had a 
strong industry with a high technology manufacture, and increased standards o f  
health and well-being (Hutton, 1995; 130).
What the post-war Labour government did, implied different things 
to the various sections o f the party. For example, for those who were committed V > 
the belief that socialism is an end state. Labour policies were the initial ax)/.· 
elementary steps. They would interpret the reforms as (if) they were the structural 
changes within the economy in terms of shifting the balance o f power away from 
private sector to public one and wage earners (Callaghan, 1989; 29). Furthermore, 
some asked the government leaders to declare that their reforms were steps toward · 
socialism (Sassoon, 1996;). However, this was a rather unrealistic account since ii;' · 
reforms were regulations within the ongoing (capitalist) system rather than .'i 
radical transformation into another system. Welfare state, social security, Naiv :, · i
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Health Service (NHS), nationalisation and planning were running for the effective 
manipulation o f the public sector for the redistribution o f power and wealth 
towards the society (Shaw, 1996: 47).
Therefore, the record of Labour government became the onset o f  
another debate for the left. For a long time, the calibration or adaptation of socialist 
ideals into the realm o f real politic had mostly been in the theoretical level and 
remained as a matter o f intellectual debate and speculation. Whereas, at the 
moment. Labour, a political organisation committed to socialist goals anyhow, was 
in power and playing within the capitalist system. More interestingly, the social 
reforms for which Labour gained electoral support had to be financed by a strong 
and growing capitalist economy (Sassoon, 1996: 150). Sassoon, with much 
exaggeration, says that what induced the government to try to do something with 
the private sector was not socialism but the balance o f payment crisis. (Sassoon, 
1996: 154). This argument does not hold true, but it was a fact that, apart from 
some wishful thoughts. Labour, similar to most o f the European left-wing parties 
including communists, had no worked-out plan for a structural transformation o f  
the state and ownership. Here was (and is) the unavoidable paradox socialist parties 
has faced: If the existing power and economic relations cannot be abolished, then 
the capitalist system had to be encouraged to produce wealth and growth. 
Inevitably, this would mean the empowerment o f the underlying grounds o f the 
system, together with the reproduction o f the discourse o f the system. Therefore to 
call what post-war left governments founded as ‘social capitalism’ is not wrong. 
This controversy indicates that what distinguishes the centre left from the radical
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versions o f it is that instead o f concentrating on the the socialism versus capitalism 
debate, they mostly seek to answer the question o f what model o f capitalism mixed 
with socialist and egalitarian ideas can be implemented. For the time being, having 
articulated in the form o f the strong welfare state and Keynesianism, Labour had 
found its answer to this question.
2.3 Revisionist Challenge
During the 1940s, debate over this dilemma and similar questions 
were not raised forcefully since as Foote writes, “it seemed more important to 
carry through change than to theorise them in the circumstances o f the 1940s’' 
(Foote, 1997: 186). The more radical and Marxist faction o f Labour remained silent 
either because of their wait-and-see attidute, interpreting the reforms as steps 
towards socialism, or due to the popularity of the government in the public’s view. 
However, the battle was just delayed until the early 1950s. Immediately following 
the electoral defeat of Labour in 1951, it began. Precisely, the response to the 
dilemma mentioned above came through two different echelons. According to the 
first solution, which is called revisionism, what Labour achieved in the 1940s had 
already solved the question, and reformed/transformed capitalism into a humanistic 
and egalitarian form. When this is the case, it was unnecessary to search for further 
policies, and insist on complete public ownership since the mixed economy and. 
Keynesian techniques were adequate means for what Labour seeks to do. In this 
view, socialism was re-defined in more ethical terms referring to a set o i  
humanistic, fair and egalitarian values, rather than a distinct politico-economic
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system. The post-war revisionism sought to tone down the differences with 
liberalism, while distancing itself from anti-capitalist stance of traditional 
socialism. In Sassoon’s words, “if  capitalism can promote growth, then socialism 
can leave well alone and concentrate on its remaining priority: ensuring an 
equitable division o f the fruits o f the growth” (Sassoon, 1996: 245). To the 
revisionists, socialism was a philosophy o f distributional justice and its main goals 
were greater equality, social justice and the preservation o f full employment. In this 
analysis, with its capacity to produce growth which can be distributed through post­
war settlements, capitalism had became something that can be tolerated, at the 
expense o f conceptualising socialism as a different system of power and economic 
relations.
The leading theoretician and spokesman o f revisionism was 
Anthony Crosland whose book The Future of Socialism (1956) became the most 
important study in determining the elements of the revisionist thought. Crosland’s 
primary criticism was about the negative view on the capitalist development. This 
negative view had assumed that socialist goals could not be realised unless 
capitalism was abolished (Sassoon, 1996: 245). However, Crosland argued that 
capitalism had changed, it had been ‘reformed and modified almost out o f  
existence’ (Fielding, 1997: 41). At the same time, he asserted Britain had become a 
capitalist society in which the business class had lost its commanding position 
while economic decisions were at the hands o f public industrial managers and full 
employment had increased the power of organised labour (Shaw, 1996: 56). 
Therefore, the ownership o f the means of production had been irrelevant, and.
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nationalisation could not be a socialist end. The revisionist view, following the 
Keynesian observation, and Biimhamian idea o f Managerial Revolution, claimed 
that the management o f the instruments o f production had gone out o f the hands o f  
the capital owners to the shareholders and managers who are not owners of the 
production means (Crosland, 1956 in Sassoon, 1996: 246). Fiscal, monetary and 
legislative controls had already limited the autonomy o f selfish business decisions, 
and a new balance of power was settled as a permanent feature o f post-war society. 
In this context, Marxist analysis of bourgeoisie and proletariat with diametrically 
opposed interests and in constant conflict had proved incorrect with new realities 
(Gamer and Kelly, 1993; 141). The capitalist welfare state could provide free 
health care, education and social benefits for those in need. Major disparities in 
income and wealth could be remedied by fiscal policy, public expenditure, social 
benefits, and progressive tax regime (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 141-142). In brief, 
the real ‘enemy’ o f the Labour Party was not capitalism itself but a certain i.e. 
laissez-faire model of it.
A similar sort of revisionist view came from Strachey (1956). He 
had been once closely associated with traditional communist circles in England in 
the 1930s, but following his reading of Keynes, he had modified his ideas and 
defended a state directed capitalist economic system (Foote, 1997: 205). For him 
the present problem was not the instability of capitalist system, but the question of 
economic oligarchs within it. He, therefore, called for a new capitalism to be 
controlled in the interests of the population rather than a few oligarchs. Democracy 
would be the main theme in this attempt (Foote, 1997: 206). The separation o f
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owners from managers, for Straychey, would mean an important aspect o f 
economic democracy. Then, through political democracy, state intervention could 
guide the economy in response to the people (Foote, 1997: 207).
Hugh Gaitskell, who became the leader o f the party in 1955 as the 
successor o f Attlee following the second electoral defeat in 1951, sought to 
incorporate revisionist ideas in order to draw a new direction for Labour. 
Croslandite analysis provided the intellectual justification for his policy 
preferences and Gaitskell wanted Labour to stand for a view o f socialism as public 
morality against the acquisitive values of traditional capitalism (Foote, 1997: 221). 
Fie began to shift policy away from nationalism, public ownership.
After Labour’s failure to win the 1959 election, a period o f open 
conflict between the Gaitskellite leadership and left-wing activists occurred. To the 
former, the reason for the electoral defeat was the ‘old fashioned’ image of the 
party. And the key to the party’s problems was its association with public 
ownership (Fielding, 1997: 14). In the 1959 Party conference Gaitskell, in his 
speech, called for the abolition of Clause IV. -However, due to the lack o f support 
on the National Executive Committee, he could not abolish it (Callaghan, 1989: 36). 
Instead, he and the revisionist wing were allowed to add a further statement o f aims 
to Clause IV in which there was no emphasis on public ownership (Fielding, 1997: 
58).
Revisionism was opposed by fundamentalists who were organised 
around the journal Tribune. They had been remarkably ineffectual on the 
determination o f the party policy. They were led by Bevan (1953) who argued that
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capitalism had not been transformed or modified nor the basic class and power 
structures had been altered (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 144). He advocated that the 
aim o f Labour should be the transformation o f society in the interests of the 
working class. According to him this could be realised only by attacking on the 
private property o f owner class (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 144; Shaw, 50). 
Therefore, public ownership had to be central to the socialist strategy and 
démocratisation. Revising this estimation would mean being “frightened by the 
administrative difficulties which accompany the nationalisation of major 
industries” (Bevan, 1952 in Callaghan, 1989: 32). The Bevanite solution, together 
with the arguments o f Crossman (1952) who claimed that ‘the enemy of human 
progress is the managerial society and the central coercive power which goes with 
it’, focused on the concept o f industrial democracy. However, its connotation was 
not only fairness at the workplace. Callaghan notes that he had probably more in 
mind than just industrial democracy when he defined the main task of socialism as 
reversing the trend towards oligarchy and distributing responsibility as welt as 
enlarging freedom o f choice. (Callaghan, 1989: 32) On such grounds. Crossman 
and Bevan also called for the démocratisation o f the party mechanisms against the 
oligarchic power within Labour and trade unions, whom unsurprisingly soon 
conspired to marginalise the Bevanites (Callaghan, 1989: 32).
2.4 Labourism and the Labour Party
Among the founding elements o f Labour Party trade unions require 
special attention since, as stated previously, the basic motive that led to the creation
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o f LRC in 1900 was the desire for independent labour representation in Parliament. 
It was mainly trade unions that gave the financial and electoral strength to the 
movement. Even the term labourism which we used in order to define the nature o f  
its politics reveals the strength o f the trade union emphasis in the party. However, 
this was a difficult marriage because there were also a considerable number o f  
party members and activists who wanted Labour to be a party o f the people as the 
representative o f national interest. Therefore, it was offered that Labour should 
avoid a strong identification with workers and unions which represents only a part 
of the society. This issue has always been a source o f disagreement between the 
factions o f Labour in its history.
Expectedly, trade union relations and working class politics have 
constantly been a focus o f revisionist thinking. According to Crosland (1956), the 
changes in the standard of living and in the composition of working class forced 
Labour to face a new electoral reality (Sassoon, 1996: 252). To this view, since the 
working class was shrinking in size, clear identification between the party and 
working class/trade unions had to be avoided.
Indeed, the matter o f trade unions is a paradoxical one. On the one 
hand, for example, as Gamer and Kelly note, many commentators imply the 
unions’ moderating influence on the Labour Party due to their highly practical and 
immediate purposes desiring a better reward for workers within a capitalist society 
while any ideological faction which was to be successful in the party had to adopt 
itself to the Labourism o f unions (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 124). Ingle (1987) also 
argues that trade unions moved ‘Labour decisively away firom socialism, making it
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very much a trade union party These arguments are meaningful and valid when 
one thinks o f the nature o f the founding elements o f Labour, and their political 
ideal. The tension between the labourism o f unions and ideology o f corporate 
socialism again supports such a view and reveals the moderating influence of 
unions in the articulation of long-term plans. The former which seeks for the fast 
improvement o f working-class living standards lacks the vision o f the latter which 
seeks, although moderately, a new kind o f society. In this sense, socialist 
movement(s) might, in many respects, be rightly suffer from the trade union 
politics which worked as an obstacle to their projects. However, there are two 
paradoxes here. First, modem socialism itself, in the conditions of the nineteenth 
and twentieth century, was bora as the emancipatory politics o f the working class. 
Thus, having conflicted with the unions, socialists were falling into conflict with 
their potential social base.
Secondly, and more interestingly, it has mostly been the revisionist 
thinking, rather than the conventional socialists, targeting trade union links as 
something to be reconsidered and severed. Furthermore, it was usually the unions 
providing support to the election o f revisionists to the executive positions in the 
party. Only after a certain point, unions cease to support them. The clearest 
examples o f this were Gaitskell and Blair. Trade union support was effective in 
their victories. However, when Gaitskell sought to abolish Clause IV, unions, 
worried at the implications for the class nature and purposes o f the Labour Party, 
opposed him. And, in Blair’s case, they had been placed in such a position that no 
longer enables them to be influential in the party’s decision making process.
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Inevitably this debate brings the question whether has it ever been 
possible to engage in socialist transformatory politics with the working class in 
general or unions in particular. If the answer is ‘no’, then what social base was left 
for a socialist movement? If the answer is ‘yes’, why have unions been more 
prone to empower revisionists who were at the end sought to dispower them? To 
fully investigate and explain this dilemma exceeds the dimensions o f this study, but 
those are vital questions for socialist politics.
2.5 Pragmatic Social Democracy in Charge
The combination of events in the early 1960s led the ideological 
debates to be temporarily suspended. There were two causes of this. First was the 
arrival o f Harold Wilson as the new leader in 1963, following the surprising death 
of Gaitskell. Second, the failure of the Conservative government, especially in 
economic matters, and rising popularity of Labour, provided the party with some 
prospect o f winning, which had a uniting effect (Felling and Reid, 1996: 115, 118). 
Wilson himself, for a long time, adopted a tone which was adequately vague to 
appeal almost all factions of Labour. Detailed policy remained revisionist in terms 
o f content, but it was dressed in a radical rhetoric. Callaghan points out that Wilson 
appealed to the left through his emphasis on the evils o f British capitalism and to 
the revisionists because he shared their views on public ownership and ethical 
socialism (Callaghan, 1989: 37). Indeed, the key to Wilson’s success was that he 
could transcend the ideological dispute in the party by emphasising the need for 
Labour to modernise the economy. Modernisation o f Britain was both a neutral
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term which neither fundamentalists nor revisionist would attack, and also an ideal 
weapon against the Conservatives (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 145). In brief, Wilson 
utilised a technocratic rhetoric in a patriotic language. He argued that only Labour 
could ensure Britain’s economic prosperity in the time of the ‘white heat’ o f the 
technological change. (Coxall and Robins, 1998: 37). State planning and 
intervention- not necessarily nationalisation- would help the economy to adapt 
(Fielding, 1997: 70). Eric Shaw notes that, indeed the mode o f planning favoured 
by Wilson did not involve a significant transgression o f the market order or 
business autonomy but sought to enhance the competitive position o f British 
industry in domestic and foreign markets by intensified and institutionalised 
collaboration between government and industry (Shaw, 1996: 74) where unions 
were not totally excluded.
As can be expected, public evaluation o f Wilson governments were 
not much on ideological grounds but merely on pragmatic ones regarding the 
success o f the government (Radice,1989; Callaghan, 1989) Although the 
government had started well in 1964, by creating a Department o f Economic 
Affairs, and a National Prices and Incomes Board, which attempted to carry on 
Britain’s first National Plan, a balance o f payments crisis forced the government to 
abandon the planned growth, which in turn, forced a devaluation o f the sterling 
and a cut in public spending. The government had indeed achieved a confidence 
boost in the general election in 1966, but this did not prevent the monetary crisis 
(Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 146). Furthermore, against the flourishing strikes, the 
Wilson govenunent introduced a ’White Paper, In Place of Strife, aiming to reduce
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the power o f the unions, which brought compulsory strike ballots and measures 
against unofficial strikes, and sought to curb wage rises (Coxall and Robins, 1998; 
32; Callaghan, 1989: 35). Finally, although establishment of widows’ pension, the 
expansion o f higher education, comprehensive schools, and the founding o f the 
Open University were not insignificant, having failed in economic management - 
let alone growth or modernisation- the Wilson government was replaced by the 
conseiwatives in 1970.
Inevitably, the failure of the 1964-70 Labour government 
symbolised the failure o f revisionist thinking. It started to be clear that it was 
highly problematic. The increasing inability o f the State to effectively fight the 
economic crisis using Keynsesian techniques was ignored. One o f the great 
problems here was, as Shaw notes, that although Keynes had written at a time of 
high unemployment and low prices, the decade o f the 1970s was a time of riding 
unemployment and rising prices (Shaw, 1996; 237). Shaw also notes another very 
basic weakness in revisionist thinking: They were so adhered to the idea that 
capitalism in itself was no longer a problem for socialists that they could not detect 
the rising capitalist power (Shaw, 1996: 235). Welfare and equality were treated as 
if  they had nothing to do with the power relations underlying the mixed economy. 
(Shaw, 1996: 215). In short, there were two dilemmas o f revisionism. First, one the 
one hand, it utilised a rhetoric o f ‘changing realities’, but on the other, it failed to 
recognise the changing nature of the capitalism and ‘new realities’. Second, and 
more importantly, revisionism heavily relied in the possibility o f the realisation of  
an egalitarian and humanitarian society when economic growth is achieved
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anyhow. In other words, it thought that the cake would have been divided fairly 
since there had been enough for all, without recognising that some would get the 
biggest part. However, it must be emphasised, despite all the weaknesses in 
understanding the political economy of capitalism, in its every aspect revisionism 
of the 1960s did not moved to question or think revise its socialist, mostly 
egalitarian aspirations. Nevertheless, this was not enough.
2.6 The challenge of The Left
In 1970, even in the eyes o f the revisionists, the record o f the 
Wilson governments was extremely bad. For example, when Crosland (1974), the 
leading figure o f revisionism, came to give an account o f the Labour governments 
between 1964 and 1970, he acknowledged that there was very little sign o f a 
coherent strategy and the economic performance was far from successful. 
Although even this recognition did not lead Crosland to give up or modify the roots 
of the revisionist view, immediately a strong criticism o f both revisionism and pre­
revisionist ideology o f Labour i.e. corporate socialism which had put more 
emphasis on public ownership, came onto the agenda. The left bloc o f Labour 
engaged in more grave and challenging policy proposals. Now, the intellectual 
initiative had passed to the left (Callaghan, 1989: 40). And in the Labour Party 
circles they were being taken into account more seriously.
The intellectual foundations o f the leftist challenge were fed with 
the studies of Stuart Holland (1975), Michael Barratt Brown (1972), and Ken 
Coates (1977). One o f the main claims of the left was that ‘socialism was about
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power relations in society as much as it was economic equality’ (Gamer and Kelly, 
1993; 147). According to this view, revisionist analysis was far from providing a 
useful analysis o f capitalism that retained all its old anarchical and anti-social 
tendencies. Furthermore, the ability of the State to manage the British economy, 
one o f the tenets of revisionist thought, was under increasing danger from the 
transnational companies, and only a radical socialist platform could regain the 
initiative of the Labour Party. If Labour could not break the politics and the 
economics of consensus, then all the hard-fought gains would be taken back in a 
time when the private capital was getting dangerously powerful (Foote, 1997: 304). 
In a similar vein, Stuart Holland (1975), pointing out the growing power o f 
multinational companies which ‘have created a new mode o f production 
distribution and exchange in the British economy’ by undermining the exercise of 
public control in their action’, claimed the invalidity o f Crosland’s analysis that 
capitalism developed into a sort of democratic economy through managerial 
revolution and shareholding (Foote, 1997; 308). The Alternative Economic 
Strategy (AES) constitutes the core of the left’s answer to the contemporary 
capitalism. It was based on enlarged public expenditure, progressive income tax, 
wealth tax, nationalisation supported by statutory planning agreements, and import 
quotas (Callaghan, 1989: 40).
Therefore, in harmony with the goal o f making the centres o f power 
such as multinationals subject to popular control, decentralisation, participation, 
industrial democracy and worker’s control at the workplace became the primary 
themes of the Labour left. A further step to this was Tony Bonn’s (the future leader
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o f the Labour left) demand for the extension o f democratic reform and 
decentralisation o f British state itself According to the New Left, a heavy 
centralism was not conducive to quality o f life whether it happens in socialism or 
capitalism, and a decentralised and participatory socialism was advocated (Gamer 
and Kelly, 1993: 147; italic added)). All these fresh proposals for démocratisation 
(of both politics and economics) also brought the support of new social movements, 
i.e. feminists, greens, students, to the Labour Party in the late 1970s (Leys and 
Panitch, 1997: 173; Callaghan, 1989: 40). The New Left appeared to be really new 
in the sense that it challenged both the mainstream Labour ideology and British 
politics, and it brought new issues to the agenda. In Leys and Panitch’s words: 
“The Labour Left was part o f a wider response within parliamentary socialist 
parties to the crisis o f the post-war order. What distinguished it from the others, 
however, was how much farther it went in fighting for a radical reorganisation o f 
the relationship between state and party, and between party and people” (Leys and 
Panitch, 1997: 6).
The New Left, enjoying its rising popularity, succeeded in getting 
the party to adopt the Labour’s Programme at the 1973 Conference o f the party. 
The programme proposed the creation o f a National Enterprise Board, planning, 
industrial democracy and capital movement controls; hence it implied a leftward 
shift in the party policy. However, the 1974 election manifesto o f Labour carried 
few elements from the New Left agenda since the figureheads o f Labour like 
Wilson, Callaghan and Healey, who were more influential in the preparation o f the 
manifesto, regarded the contents of the agenda as unacceptable (Gamer and Kelly,
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1993: 149). Nevertheless, when Labour won the election, since the popularity o f 
the left faction was not totally negligible, two leading figures of the left, Tony 
Benn and Michael Foot, were appointed to the posts of Industry and Employment. 
However, as pointed out by many, they were deliberately isolated from basic 
decision making mechanisms, dispossessed o f power and deprived o f funds to 
institute policies. Furthermore, in 1975, Wilson, demoted Benn to the department 
of Energy in order to end his influence in the government (Gamer and Kelly, 1993; 
150).
The Labour governments of Wilson (1974-1976) and Callaghan 
(1976-1979) were again unsuccessful. They were unable to cope with rising 
economic problems, many of which were the results o f the long-term economic 
weakness of the British economy, rising inflation, unemployment, and balance of 
payment deficits.' Limited increases in wages along with public spending cuts 
corresponding to high inflation, led to strikes among workers and paved the way to 
the ‘Winter of Discontent’ with a number of strikes. The Labour Party, in the 
subsequent election, was replaced with the Thatcher-led Conservative government 
which marked a new era both in British politics and Labour Party. However, the 
new era o f the former was to continue much longer than that of the latter. The crisis 
o f the British State and the world economy in the late 1970s ended with the defeat 
o f Labour from power with no memory of success for the government.
' In order to cope with the crisis, the government acquired a large ($3 million) loan from the IMF, in 
return o f massive public spending cuts. (See: Coxall and Robins, 1998) Meanwhile, the most 
important development for Labour’s economic policy, was that, in 1976, Callaghan announced, 
that Keynesian economics as a choice ceased to exist as a choice for governments. (See: Shaw, 
1996)
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2.7 The Left Directs Labour
Labour re-elected Callaghan as leader and Michael Foot as his 
deputy after the reassembly o f Parliament in 1979. The party could agree on the 
harshness o f the Thatcher’s policies, but it was not united on anything else (Felling 
and Reid, 1996: 162). The majority in the National Executive Committee was 
favoured the policies of Tony Berm, and he was also backed by a faction in the 
party. Labour Co-ordinating Committee. Callaghan was charged with the electoral 
failure and disregarding the voice o f the grass-roots o f the party. In this regard. 
Berm and his supporters called for a three-fold proposal in order to make the 
leadership more responsible to the grass-roots of the party: First, the leader should 
be elected by the party organs at large rather than the parliamentary party. Second, 
before a new general election, MPs should be compulsorily re-selected. Third, the 
control o f the election manifesto should not be left to the hand o f the parliamentary 
executive alone. At the party conference in October 1979, the second and the third 
proposals were carried but the first one was rejected (Felling and Reid, 1996: 162). 
However, all those, in order to be implemented, had to wait until the 1980 
Conference for the constitutional confirmation. Surprisingly, while the call about 
the control o f the election manifesto was rejected, the proposal about the election 
of the leader passed (Felling and Reid, 1996: 163). Following the conference 
Callaghan resigned, and Michael Foot was elected as the new leader, and Dennis
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Healey became the deputy. It was the first time in Labour that a man strongly 
identified with the Left was elected.
The failures o f the Wilson and Callaghan governments had provided 
the opportunity to the Left bloc to challenge the revisionism soundly. And with the 
latest developments at the conference the Labour left became more influential than 
ever, holding the balance o f power within the party. Moreover, the Labour left, 
especially the Militant Tendency, utilised strong support and control over the local 
government especially the Greater London Council, Liverpool, and Sheffield, 
Stirling and Walsall (Sassoon, 1996: 694). Meanwhile, the rising support of the 
trade unions which began to realise that revisionist policies at the end had not been 
in favour o f them, should also be mentioned. As it was stated in previous pages, 
trade unions had mostly played a counter role to the radical proposal in Labour. In 
the late 1970s, there were two points that worked in favour of the Labour left. First 
was a right-wing split. The Transport and General Workers’ Union, the largest one 
affiliated to Labour, had started to back Labour left by decisively counter­
balancing the right-wing unions. Second, there was a reaction to the last Labour 
governments’ policies towards workers and unions (Sassoon, 1996: 694).
Some policy proposals of the New Left were already stated above. 
Following the election o f Foot, the annual conference of Labour voted for the AES 
(Alternative Economic Strategy), industrial democracy, a 35-hour week with no 
loss o f pay, cuts in the arms expenditure, abolition o f private education and health 
services, wealth tax, and removal o f US military installations firom Britain and 
unilateral disarmament (Callaghan, 1989: 42). This was the most radical policy
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combination the Labour Party has ever articulated throughout the twentieth 
century. ^
However, it did not work. These policies could not find public 
support as evidenced by the election results. Having fought the 1983 general 
election with The New Hope For Britain, a New Left document, Labour was far 
from winning.^ The failure and the defeat o f the New Left was the beginning o f a 
new and long turn for the Labour Party. Those will be the concerns o f following 
chapters.
Nevertheless, the question why the New Left failed is still being 
asked, since for many it had become a last hope for changing the Britain’s face 
into a democratic socialist country. Thus, as the final part o f this chapter we will 
briefly look at some analyses.
Indeed, analyses can be grouped in two basic categories. First, there 
are those focusing on the internal weaknesses and the failure o f the New Left 
policies to provide feasible solutions. A second line o f analysis seeks to find an 
answer to why these policies were not favoured by the public. Donald Sassoon, 
who wrote one o f the largest and detailed books on the twentieth century history o f  
social democrat/democratic socialist politics, explains the first point by the 
vagueness and ‘conservative’ nature o f the New Left policies. Its strategy, he 
writes, was predicated on a concept o f national sovereignty that was no longer
 ^ One o f the consequences o f the radicalisation became a split in Labour. In 1981, 25 secessionists 
from Labour, leaded by, the ‘Gang o f Four’: David Owen, Shirley Williams, Bill Rodgers, and Roy 
Jenkins. The aim was to found a party occupying the centre o f British politics. The SDP moved into 
alliance with the Liberals. After some moderate success, it ceased to exist in 1990.
 ^ It polled 27.6 per cent, while the Conservatives did 42 per cent, and the Liberal-SDP alliance 
collected 25 per cent
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relevant. Its strategy assumed that a majority in the House of Commons led by a 
trustworthy leadership (one which would not betray the movement) was all that 
was required to implement a left wing programme (Sassoon, 1996: 702). Then, 
Sassoon adds, to call this as conservatism is not a polemical exaggeration since it 
was a consequence of New Left’s deep identification with both labourism and the 
British State. Thus, it had many features in common with British conservatism: 
confidence in the country’s world importance, superiority o f its political 
institutions, the acceptance o f national-imperial mould as the optimal foundation 
(Sassoon, 1996: 703). In this regard, for Sassoon, the New Left was far from 
grasping the new developments in the world. The only policy o f the New Left 
became responding to the Thatcherite radicalisation of politics by radicalising its 
own brand without hard-work (Sassoon, 1996: 693).
For the second point, Sassoon’s answer is about the public image of 
the party. To the working-class supporters, he argues : Labour began to appear as 
if the part had fallen into the hands of ineffectual, college-educated militants, 
pandering to a intimidating lobby of lesbians, holier-than-thou ecologists, 
puritanical vegetarians and loud-mouth black activists, while middle classes saw 
Labour as if  it had been commandeered by disrespectful proletarians, Tumpen- 
polytecnic’ (Sassoon, 1996: 697). Interestingly, new social movements which, as 
we mentioned, had started to flirt with the New Left were less than supportive due 
to the macho style and language o f the Left, but more fundamentally due to the 
Left’s disregard o f such movements. The basic problem was the narrow definition 
of the socialist action as that o f the party and the unions, as the only agents
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socialist change (Sassoon, 1996: 698-90). These factors, according to Sassoon, 
when combined with the rising popularity o f Thatcher with Falklands war and the 
successful electoral campaign o f conservatives in contrast to Labour’s 
amateurishness, first led to electoral defeat in 1983, and then meant the defeat o f 
the Left within Labour (Sassoon, 1996: 700-701).
Colin Leys and Leo Panitch, contrary to Sassoon and many others 
argue that Labour’s New Left had quite clear ideas about recent developments, 
basically globalisation and European unification (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 263). 
They argue that the New Left thinkers, particularly Tony Benn and Stuart Holland, 
recognised, even before their opponents, how the globalisation o f the economy 
from the late 1960s onwards was destroying the ‘Keynesian capacity’ of all nation­
states, on which the social democratic management o f capitalism depended; and it 
was this recognition that led them to have a challenging project to both 
conventional labourism and British politics. (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 263-264). 
Then, it is added, ‘the Labour left’s project was not a utopian or idealist affair; it 
sought to respond- but to respond radically- to the world as it actually existed’ 
(Leys and Panitch, 1997: 266).
To the question of why Labour became unpopular. Leys and Panitch 
seek to provide answers, unlike Sassoon, not simply through the perceived image 
of the party, but, first, through emphasising how the left’s challenge was beaten 
back with the ‘support’ o f the state (the civil service, the Bank o f England, the 
judiciary, the policy and the military), all sections o f capital, and media - not only 
partisan tabloid press but all mainstream media (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 264}
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Second, they point out that the advantageous international conditions initially 
existed in the beginning o f the New Left challenge was changed. The crisis o f the 
industrial west, they write, had been resolved in favour o f capital and the British 
left could not be immune from the consequences (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 264).
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CHAPTER HI
TOWARDS THE RIGHT
3.1Labour under Kinnock
Neil Kinnock, the new leader of Labour, acted quickly to initiate the 
transformation of the party. Although in his early days in Labour, he had been 
left-wing radical, as a leader Kinnock’s conclusion was that Labour had to be re­
directed to the middle ground in order to appeal the voters who abandoned Labour 
in the last two elections (Shaw, 1996: 168). This was to say, Foote observes, tha' 
“Labour had to adopt its political values to those o f the non-socialist sections o f the 
population, hungering after an illusory security from the frightening world outside” 
(Foote, 1997: 328). Kinnock’s reestablishment o f moderate social democrac/ 
occurred with remarkably little opposition since he had been elected by a:: 
overwhelming majority from all sections o f the electoral college after the shockin; ; 
defeat.
To Kinnock, the party had become unpopular since its policieij ha 
reflected the views o f radical activists and trade union members who v/eA ·
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representing the majority o f the electorate (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992: 31). 
Therefore, their power in the party had to be curbed. In this regard, reducing the 
power o f activists within the party, and simultaneously enabling the leadership to 
determine the party policy became the central themes o f Kinnock’s organisational 
changes. The first attack came in 1984 when Kinnock attempted to limit activists’ 
power by introducing the one member-one vote principle for parliamentary 
selection. However, in the party conference he failed to pass this. A better and 
effective chance occurred in 1985 when the (Militant) leaders of Liverpool city 
council issued redundancy notices to all its employees. However, although this was 
oriented as a ploy against the Government, it angered the unions and its own 
workforce (Shaw, 1996: 175). Expectedly, Kinnock did not waste a minute, and at 
the 1985 Conference, he started a powerful onslaught on the party activists, and 
accused them for ‘asking the impossible’. His speech paved the way to the 
formation o f an alliance between the right and the soft-left around the personality 
of Kinnock.' Enjoying this power, Kinnock, in 1988, introduced a new regulation 
whereby local constituency party electoral colleges were created for the 
selection/reselection of the parliamentary candidates. According to this, affiliated 
local trade unions were limited to 40 per cent of the vote, and the 60 per cent o f the 
vote were allocated to the individual membership in the foundation o f the local 
electoral college. Meanwhile, local parties were advised to consult their individual 
memxbers before casting their votes in the 1988 leadership elections (Seyd and
' Following the defeat o f the New Left, during the leadership o f Kinnock, a group o f former 
Bennites had given up their radical approach and left the Bennite circle. They were then called soft · 
left. Whereas, those who stayed with Tony Benn were called hard-left.
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Whiteley, 1992; 32). Although limited, this was a preliminary step for the long- 
tenn plans o f the leadership. Another change initiated by Kinnock in 1988 was that 
he succeeded in making trade unions agree that, after 1993 the weight of the trade 
union bloc vote at the annual conference would be reduced from 90 per cent to 70 
per cent, then when the individual membership exceeds 300,000, it would be 
reduced to the 50 per cent.
At this point, some information regarding the organisational 
structure of the contemporary Labour Party is necessary. At the national level, 
there are five elements of Labour’s organisation: the Parliamentary Labour Party 
(PLP), the Labour Party headquarters, the National Executive Committee (NEC), 
the annual conference, and the leader o f the party. Although, the NEC is 
theoretically subservient to the conference (since it is elected by the party 
conference), in reality, the NEC dominates the party. The reason for this is that 
most aspects of the party policy originate from within the NEC (Fisher, 1996: 67). 
The NEC also has joint responsibility along with the leadership, for concluding the 
party manifesto. Meanwhile, agencies like the Shadow Communication Agency 
(SCA)^, which was founded to improve the party’s image, has a role within the 
manifestation and policy determination process. The point is that agencies are 
strictly linked to the leadership and they run under its supervision. Under Kinnock, 
a new system of Joint Policy Committees including an equal ratio o f NEC 
members and MPs were created. Although they were chaired by NEC members.
■ SCA was founded by Peter Mendelson, and co-ordinated by Philip Gould, a professional market 
research and advertisement specialist, in order to gather information about electorate and its 
tendencies. Mandelson was responsible for the relations with media and public image o f the party.
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and assisted by secretaries from headquarters and PLP members, strong control of 
their agendas and outcomes were given to the hands o f the leadership (Leys and 
Panitch, 1997: 220).
At the local level, most Parliamentary constiturencies have a 
Constiturency Labour Party (CLP). In order to become a member of the Labour 
Party one has to become a member of one o f the local parties. In addition to 
individual members, each CLP also enjoys another type o f membership like that of 
socialist societies, or local extensions o f Fabian society, or the co-operative society. 
However, the enormous membership at the local level was dominated, until the late 
1990s, by trade union members (Gamer and Kelly, 1993: 163).
The leader and deputy leader are elected by an electoral college 
composed of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), affiliated organisations, and 
individual members. In the calculation of votes, a third o f the votes are allocated to 
the PLPs, the affiliated organisations, and constituencies. In order to be elected, 
candidates must score more than 50 per cent of the vote, or a second ballot is held. 
This system was developed when New Left had the control o f Labour, replacing 
the election by PLP alone.
At the moment, a challenger to the leadership needs to have the 
support o f at least 20 per cent o f the PLPs. This was 5 per cent prior to 1988 and it 
was implemented in order to curb the power of internal opposition.. Moreover, if  
Labour is in government, this has to be accompanied by the approval for the 
contest by at least two-thirds o f the annual conference. These stipulations, Fisher 
writes, “led many to observe that despite Labour’s stronger democratic credentials,
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it is easier to unseat a Conservative leader than it is to unseat a Labour leader 
(Fisher, 1996: 71).
The first and the foremost question regarding the power distribution 
within Labour, for a long time, had been the power o f trade unions and the bloc 
vote. Under block vote, affiliated unions declare a number o f affiliated members. 
And this number counts for the vote of union in a single direction as if  given by 
that number of members. To the supporters o f the block vote, Fisher notes, it keeps 
with Labour’s traditions and notions of representative democracy, whereby 
decisions are both collectively reached and adhered to. However, to the opponents 
of the bloc vote, it is undemocratic, so that votes are cast on behalf o f people who 
have little to say in the decisions these votes are supposed to reflect, while it does 
prevent the minority representation (Fisher, 1996: 68-69). The debate is now over. 
This is because of the fact that, first, the block vote which accounted for 90 per 
cent of conference votes until 1992, was first, reduced to 70 per cent, with a further 
plan o f reduction to 50 per cent, then under Blair it was reduced to 50 per cent. 
Moreover, with the passage o f One Member One Vote (OMOV), in 1993, block 
vote practice, in the selection of the parliamentary candidates, was abolished. 
Under OMOV, each CLP member enjoys a single and equal vote in the selection 
process.
CLPs are presented with lists from short-list candidates. These 
short-lists include trade union nominees, CLP nominees, and co-operative 
societies’ nominees. When the candidates are short-listed, there conies the vote o f 
CLP members. Finally, elected candidates are subjected to the approval o f the NEC
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which has the veto power. Although it is not frequently exercised, since the late 
1980s, the NEC, which is strictly supervised by the leadership, manipulates this 
veto power as a sort o f enforcement mechanism to ensure the election o f 
‘appropriate’ candidates (Fisher, 1996: 74).
3.2 Policy Revie>v, 1987-1992
Despite all efforts to change the party’s image, in the 1987 general 
election Labour experienced its third successive defeat. Labour’s share of vote 
slightly increased from 27.6 percent to 31.7 percent, and the Conservatives polled 
43.4 percent which is a bit more than they did in 1983 election. The Liberal-SDP 
alliance polled again almost a quarter o f the vote. Conservatives were once more 
able to command a huge majority in Parliament. Since then, rather than engaging 
in new organisational regulations, Kinnock and his leadership team, now 
manipulating the power enabled by the organisational changes, initiated a radical 
policy changing process in the party. This was titled as Policy Review. Indeed, in 
the 1987 election. Labour had fought with a Manifesto, Britain Will Win, which 
had already jettisoned the former emphasis on the pledges -such as full 
employment, radical distribution of wealth and power, large public spending- of 
previous manifesto. However, pledges for bringing the privatised industries into 
public sector, union empowerment, and unilateral nuclear disarmament were still in 
the manifesto despite the counter efforts o f the leadership (Driver and Martell, 
1998: 14). However, now a deeper transformation was on the way, and it was to
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be another step in rapprochement o f Labour to the new ‘establishment’ founded by 
Thatcher governments.
The Policy review started with campaign called ‘Labour Listens' 
which failed even at the beginning. Shadow ministers went around the country, 
and public meetings were organised, in order to gather the views of people. 
However, it proved unsuccessful, meetings were poorly attended and there was no 
concern for those who came to ‘listen’ (Taylor, 1997: 51-52).
The Policy Review was organised through seven ‘Policy Reviev/ 
Groups’ each of which was jointly chaired by a member o f the NEC, and a member 
of the Labour Front Bench. The membership o f the review was also dominantly 
composed of the NEC and Shadow Cabinet. Only in two groups. People at Work, 
and Physical and Social Environment, trade union and local party members were 
majority since there was not much enthusiasm to them from MPs. (Taylor, 1997: 
47). The whole monitoring and co-ordination was conducted by the Campaign 
Management Team headed by Tom Sawyer.
The first report was the Statement o f Democratic Aims and Values 
(1988) which was primarily written by Roy Hattersley, Its main objective was to 
furnish some ideological mourning to the transformation o f the Party, but it was 
almost immediately forgotten (Shaw, 1996: 182). This is largely because o f the 
fact that it was still committed to an idea o f democratic socialism whose 
ideological foundations were developed in Hattersley’s Choose Freedom (1987). 
To Hattersley, states Jones, “Democratic socialism was ‘about an extension o f  
freedom brought about by a more equal distribution o f resources’, and it was
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political ideology that ‘required the use of collective power to increase individual 
rights and to extend individual freedom’” (Jones, 1996: 122). Of the state-market 
relation, while reiterating support for a market economy, he clearly rejected the 
neo-liberal view by stressing the limitations of the notion of an economically-based 
freedom of choice, and strongly criticised the ffee-market fetishism (Jones, 1996: 
122-123).
Hattersley’s statement did not make any political impact. Firstly 
because it was still within the tradition of Labour socialism which the leadership 
was trying to avoid. Second, it was dealing with the matter in theoretical, 
substantive context, whereas Labour was searching for policy prescriptions and 
electoral attractiveness.
Publication o f Social Justice and Economic Efficiency, in 1988 was 
generally interpreted as the first explicit expression o f Labour’s discovery o f the 
free market. The successive reports. Meet the Challenge Make the Change (1989), 
Looking for the Future ('1990), and Opportunity Britain (1991) signalled explicit 
shifts to the right (Shaw, 1996: 182) in which the party reconsidered its 
conventional policies. The general tendency had turned to market principles from 
public initiative.
During the course of the review, extension of public ownership or 
nationalisation, which had been one of the central themes o f Labour for decades, 
was successfully dropped. Indeed, although an emphasis on such themes was still 
kept among the enthusiastic members like Bryan Gould, for Kinnock’s team most 
of these themes were unacceptable. To Kinnock, ownership was a matter o f
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ideologists (Observer, 7 September 1989). Nevertheless, as Andrew Gamble points 
out. Labour had not experienced the sort o f turn to free markets which, for 
example. New Zealand’s Labour Party did (Gamble, 1992: 67). In macro-economic 
policy, the policy review can be interpreted as a middle step within the process o f 
the abandonment o f Keynesianism which first initiated by Callaghan in 1976 in the 
face o f an economic crisis, when Labour was in government.
Although the leadership was utilising a discourse o f ‘enabling state’ 
with slight interventionist overtones, at the end o f the Policy Review, Labour had 
been committed to macro-economic management, fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, 
high exchange rate, and membership to the European Community Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) (Driver and Martell, 1998: 15; Shaw, 1996: 185).
Of the power of finance capital, which was the real victor o f the 
Thatcherite 1980s, the Policy Review was highly cautious. Gamble notes that, 
while it tries to give priority to the needs o f the industry. Labour would not seek 
any direct confrontation with the City. Its emphasis was on the moderation o f the 
short-term bias of the City’s practices, by regulating take-overs and judging them 
in terms o f public interest (Gamble, 1992: 70). Finally Labour had subordinated 
industrial policy to macro-economic policy for the sake o f stability (Gamble, 1992: 
71). As it is well known, empowerment o f finance sector at the expense o f the 
industry was one o f the prominent policy choices of the Thatcher governments.
The ‘overload’ thesis o f the state had been one o f the challenges o t 
the new-right since the mid 1970s, and was happily considered by the conservative 
governments. Of course, the welfare state (and public spending on which it v/as
56
grounded) was the primary target. According to the logic of the monetarist and 
fiscal orthodoxy, public spending had to be strictly restrained. Against this 
theoretical (and practical) assault, during the Policy Review and by the death o f  
Smith, Labour sought to accommodate, but did not give up, its beliefs on social 
justice and redistribution with the ‘requirements’ o f macro-economic management. 
Even the reports of the late 1980s indicated a significant shift towards 
accountability in public welfare, wider participation in the delivery o f services, 
promotion o f individual benefits, together with the policies to deal with poverty
The leadership was also convinced that Labour’s reputation as a 
high tax, and tax and spend party was a major electoral handicap which had to be 
avoided. Therefore, it was frequently emphasised that in a future Labour 
government, restrictive controls on both the scale and balance o f spending would 
be vital. Further, another ‘solution’ developed by the leadership was the vague 
argument that welfare finance would be based not on taxation but economic growth 
(Alcock, 1992: 147).
One of the targets of the Kinnock administration was the unions. 
They had also constituted a tough line of attack to Labour from Conservatives who 
argued that Labour was dominated by unions. We have already mentioned the 
organisational changes made on this matter. During and after the policy review. 
Labour repeatedly stated to the voters and unions, ‘there will be no return to the 
trade union legislation o f the 1970s. There will be no mass or flying tickets’ (It’s 
Time to Get Britain Working Again, 1992: 11 quoted in Shaw, 1996: 187). 
However, the most important change was that during the policy review, especially
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in the reports published in 1989 and 1990, Labour started to develop a new outlook 
to workers’ rights and trade unions. This was the conceptualisation of workers 
rights and affairs in terms o f individual rights, rather than taking it as collective 
matter of class (Rosamond, 1992: 91-95). This was significant since, although in 
the history o f the party there had occurred several tensions between the party 
leadership and the unions, it was never at the stake to think the workers’ rights as 
independent from a collective (class) matter or in terms of individual interests o f 
the workers. This would be denying the principal grounds on which the party 
stood. During the 1980s, it was Thatcherism that claimed to act in the interests of 
the individual employee against the oppressive collectivism of the trade union 
(Rosamond, 1992: 94). Now, the Labour Party was coming closer to this line. 
Funnily enough, the principal name behind these proposals was Tony Blair, the 
future leader o f the Labour Party.
3.2.1 The Meaning of the Policy Review
As observed by many, the Policy Review was first of all, a response 
to the successive electoral failures since 1979, and it was an attempt to enlarge the 
appeal of the Party through abandoning electorally unpopular policies (Jones, 1996: 
120). The Review was prompted by the electoral success of Thatcherism in terms 
o f the reshaped political agenda and institutional changes (Foote, 1997: 121). 
Therefore, at least in terms o f its own conditions, the review can be interpreted as 
an attempt to overcome continuous failure o f Labour to answer to appeal the 
voters by turning from democratic socialism to social democracy. Whe;a
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interpreting the outcomes of the process, one might pose two basic questions. First, 
did the review succeed in providing an ideologically new and coherent position to 
Labour? Second, in terms o f substance, what did the review mean for the 
articulation o f relatively alternative set o f policies which can be charged against 
the neo-liberal agenda?
To the first question, Tudor Jones provides a highly negative 
answer. According to him, the basic problem of the Policy Review was its lack of 
theoretical basis. Contrary to the revisionism o f the 1960s, it was not fed by a 
systematic analysis of the social and economic change that occurred in last twenty 
years, although it was an exercise initiated because o f the recognition o f these 
changes (Jones, 1996: 128). Gerald Taylor, in a similar vein, concludes that the 
Review proved almost nothing more than an exercise in winning votes, which was 
indeed the only matter to which the leadership appeared to be committed^ (Taylor, 
1997: 133).
To the second question, Colin Hay suggests that, having accepted 
the basic parameters o f the neo-liberal settlement. Labour’s Policy Review did not 
seek an alternative vision to the existing orthodoxy. In this respect, it was a 
compromise contributing to a new political consensus in terms o f the Conservative 
reforms: privatisation, low taxation, changes in trade union legislation, 
deregulation (Hay, 1994). Eric Shaw too, provides a similar account by interpreting
 ^ Gerald Taylor provides an ironical example and says that Labour sought to manipulate the case of 
Sweden in order to justify its ‘new’ policies referring to economic efficiency. However, the Party 
had turned to Sweden at just the time when Social Democratic hegemony in Sweden was losing its 
power.
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the Policy Review as the firm abandonment of Keynesian social democracy, which 
was to be completed by New Labour of Blair. This, for Shaw, indicates a sort o f  
new (macro-economic) consensus bounding the government to the monetary and 
fiscal requirements of supply side economics (Shaw, 1996: 202).
Contrary to these views, Martin Smith argues that binding the 
substance of the Review to the influence of Thatcherism would be too simplistic 
because Labour’s policy shift was not inconsistent with the Party’s ideological 
heritage. The Policy Review occurred in the face o f changing social, political and 
economic conditions, while the Party was still committed to its core values like 
equality and social justice (Smith, 1994; Smith, 1992). In a commentary on the 
arguments developed by Hay and Smith, M. W. Jones, proposes that neither to 
interpret the developments under Kinnock, as a surrender to Thatcherism, nor to 
see them as a process o f modernisation is correct. According to him, taking 
account of the changes brought by Thatcherism, Labour had attempted to recast its 
social democratic commitments. The result has been a renewed commitment to 
reformist objectives including social justice as well as more general goals such as 
economic efficiency” (Smith, 1994, italic added).
Writing in 1999, we now enjoy the chance of knowing the 
developments after the review, and we have seen to which extents the renewal or 
modernisation o f Labour have reached in terms o f accommodation with 
Thatcherism. This would imply two different comments. Looking from an angle 
what occurred under Kinnock might give the impression that Labour was still 
committed to its principles and values, but since it had been losing its electoral base
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and the preferences o f the electorate had been powerfully reshaped, it 
reconsidered its daily policies but remained loyal to its traditional values. However, 
looking from a different angle, again retrospectively, one might justifiably argue 
that what Kinnock initiated and more importantly the way he did it, even right at 
the start nullified the possibility of the development o f any political project which 
would be both more prone to constitute an alternative to neo-liberalism, and more 
able to shape the voters’ preferences. This alternative would not have been another 
new-left, or it would not have been Old Labour again, but it would have both 
continued the principles of old Labour without yielding all the ground to the right 
edge of the party, and also would have sought to connect the party to society at the 
largest level. It is a fact that renewal under Kinnock was made at the expense of a 
great number of members who were not only from working class but also from 
different -other than working class- groups who would have taken part in the 
articulation of a left-wing agenda. Of course, this argument caries a degree o f  
speculation but perhaps no one can deny that with Kinnock the game in the name 
o f left-wing politics had been already lost. What began to be articulated now was a 
different political vision which, as we will show in the following chapter, at the 
end would have nothing to do with the left.
3.3 The Era of John Smith, 1992-1994
In November 1990, after an astonishing internal agitation, Margaret 
Thatcher was defeated from the leadership o f the Conservative Party. Her 
successor was John Major, who entered the Commons in 1979 and served in the
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cabinet for three years. At 47, he was the youngest of the party leaders. Although 
he was expected to call an immediate general election, he decided to wait until 
1992 to hold the general election.
The manifesto o f Labour, Time to Get Britain Working Again, 
avoiding most o f the earlier pledges, focused on public transport and education, 
housing, industrial development and the rescuing of National Health Service. 
According to manifesto, Scotland would have an elected parliament, Wales would 
have an elected assembly, and local government was to be empowered (The Labour 
Party Election Manifesto, 1992). During the campaign, although John Smith, the 
shadow Chancellor, had suggested a shadow budget in which he proposed to raise 
direct taxation only for those earning £36,375 or more. Conservatives continuously 
argued that Labour’s programme could not be achieved without significant 
increase in taxation. Despite the harsh counter propaganda. Labour was ahead in 
the polls. Most o f the opinion polls were pointing to a Labour lead, or a balance in 
Parliament with no majority party (Pelling and Reid, 1996: 185). The results, 
however, again displayed a Labour defeat. Kinnock resigned immediately and 
Hattersley, the deputy leader, decided to retire. Competition for leadership occurred 
between Bryan Gould and John Smith, and it ended with a huge victory for Smith 
as leader and Margaret Beckett as deputy.
A.J. Davies notes that Smith had embodied most o f the typical 
aspects o f Old Labour. He was moderate, had solid roots in the community, and 
had links with the working class in the form of the trade union movement (Davies, 
1996: 433). He was a revisionist in thinking and a strong supporter of Gaitskell
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within the Party. However, adds Davies, he was pragmatic enough not to elevate 
his disagreements into eventual departure from Labour, when the new left directed 
the Party, unlike, for example, those who split from Labour and founded the SDP 
in 1981 (Davies, 1996: 433-434). During his leadership, he was extremely careful 
not to further the divisions within the party. Although, he shared too few idea with 
them, unlike Kinnock, he developed warm relations with the former representatives 
of the hard-left like Ken Livingstone and Tony Benn (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 
.767).
In July, the parliamentary party elected a new front bench, and 
Smith announced the shadow cabinet. According to this, Tony Blair was appointed 
to Plome Secretary, Jack Cunningham became Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook 
moved from Flealth to Trade and Industry, while Gordon Brown was appointed as 
shadow Chancellor. John Prescott was responsible for transportation, and David 
Blunkett for health.
During his campaign. Smith had already showed his intention to 
continue the organisational change initiated by Kiimock, and consolidate the 
revision of policies (Shaw, 1996: 193; Pelling and Reid, 1996: 186-187). He 
managed to get unions to pass the One Member-One Vote, which was mentioned in 
above pages.
Another important exercise that occurred under Smith was the 
establishment of the Commission on Social Justice. Although the Commission did 
not prove to be influential in the determination o f party policy and its study 
outcomes were not very original, its importance derives from the fact that '.t
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indicates to the ultimate point o f the process initiated by the Policy Review when 
Blair became the leader. Labour under Blair, as we will show, has been both a 
continuation of this process initiated by Kinnock, and also signalled a fundamental 
break with the party o f the early 1990s.
Two points about the Commission are especially worth mentioning. 
The first is its main mission. The Commission was charged to consider changes 
that had occurred in economic and social life in the last decades, and to articulate 
public policy on employment, taxation, and welfare . (Taylor, 1997: 140). Wlien 
doing this the Commission was seeking to accommodate social justice which was 
one o f the traditional goals of Labour, with economic efficiency and 
competitiveness which came to be the weighty concerns of the last two decades.
The second point about the Commission was its membership 
profile. There was an attempt to create a ‘balanced’ membership (Taylor, 1997: 
1399. Trade union representation existed but it was few, there were representations 
from clerical community, ethnic groups, and business circles. As Taylor rightly 
observes, this was the demonstration of the concern to move away from any class- 
based approach and to raise the idea that Commission (hence the Labour Party) 
represents all the nation (Taylor, 1997: 140).
Here we will not go into any detail o f the studies o f the Commission 
which produced a number o f reports and policy offerings, but will cite three pea 
portraits painted by the Commission, each o f which was though to represent a 
different economic and social model for Britain.
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1. Deregulators’ Britain
The Deregulators dream of a future in which dynamic entrepreneurs, 
unshackled by employment laws or social responsibilities, create new 
business and open up new markets; in which there is no limit to how high 
earnings at the top will rise- and no limit to how low wages at the bottom 
will fall; in which the market widens and deepens its influence; and in 
which... ‘every business relationship is a one night stand’. It is a ftiture 
o f extremes where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, and where 
the rewards for success are matched only by the risks o f failure. 
Economically it depends upon the unceasing drive for competition 
through the ever-cheaper production o f what we already produce; 
socially it relies upon the reduction o f public services and public 
spending. Politically, it is built on logic o f centralisation and exclusivity, 
destroying publicly accountable institutions that stand between law­
making government and individual decision-making in the marketplace.
2. Levellers Britain
The Levellers are concerned with the disribution o f wealth to the 
neglect of its production; they develop policies for social justice 
independent of the economy. Their strategy is founded on the idea that 
we can not use economic renewal and paid employment as the basis for 
a socially just future. The Levellers share many o f the aspirations o f the 
Investors, but they have different strategies to achieve these ambitions. 
Theirs is a strategy for social justice based primarily on redistributing 
wealth and incomes, rather than trying to increase the opportunities and 
compete in world markets. The Levellers believe that we should try to 
achieve social justice through the benefits system, rather than through a
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new combination of active welfare state, reformed labour market and 
strong community.
3, Investors’ Britain
The Investors believe we can combine the ethics o f community with the 
dynamics of a market economy. At the heart o f the Investors’ strategy is 
a belief that the extension of economic opportunity is not only the source 
of economic prosperity but also the basis o f social justice. The 
competitive requirement for constant innovation and higher quality 
demands opportunities for every individual- and not just an elite- to 
contribute to national economic renewal; this in turn demands strong 
social institutions, strong families and strong communities, which enable 
people to grow, adapt and succeed. Unlike the Deregulators, who would 
use insecurity as the spur to change, the Investors insist on security as the 
foundation of change; but unlike the Levellers, the Investors achieve 
security by redistributing opportunities rather than just redistributing 
income.(CSJ, 1994: 95-96, quoted in Taylor 1996:151-152)
Needless to say, the Investor's Britain was representing the 
Labour’s preferred model and highlighting its policies. It is recognisable from 
the text that Labour was seeking to neither give up its ‘socialist’ aspirations, 
nor miss the ‘requirements’ o f modem economics. Distributionary policies 
were not totally out o f the agenda, but they were put in another context; they 
would be exercised not through a tax and benefit system, but through a total 
growth which was supposed to be created by the individualistic enterprises in a 
dynamic economy. Collectivist aspirations were thought to help to a better life 
in such a system. Opportunity and community started to appear as the
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keywords o f this model, but they were not defined clearly. Within these 
keywords, one can trace some roots o f the modernisation Labour will 
experience under Blair. The overall impact of the Commission remained vague 
since the following events, specifically the sudden death of Smith, bypassed it. 
A new era was to come.
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CHAPTER IV
NEW LABOUR
4.1 Beginning of a New Era: Tony Blair
On July 21,1994 Tony Blair was announced as the new leader o f  
Britain’s opposition Labour Party, at a mini party conference held in London. At 
the age o f 41, he was the youngest leader of Labour ever, and had been active in 
politics since 1983. He had most recently served as shadow home secretary.
Blair polled 57 per cent o f the total vote. 61 per cent of the MPs, 58 
per cent o f the party members and 52 per cent o f trade unions had voted for him. 
In the leadership election, he competed with two figures: .Tohn Prescott, who was 
the shadow employment secretary, and Margaret Backett, Labour’s deputy leader 
under Smith, who had been the temporary leader since his death. The former polled 
24 per cent o f the vote and the latter did 19 per cent. Prescott became the deputy 
leader o f Labour (source: Rentoul, 1995: 404).
Blair’s shadow cabinet was no surprise: Gordon Brown was 
appointed shadow Chancellor, Robin Cook became foreign secretary, and Jack 
Straw was promoted for Home Affairs. Harriet Harman was responsible for
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Employment, Donald Dewar for Social Security and Jack Cunningham for Trade 
and Industry. The team was sharing similar ideas and ideals for the future o f the 
party. In other words, they were all modernisers.
On his first day in his new office, Blair’s first message went to 
trade unions. He suggested that they expect ‘fairness not favour’ from a Labour 
government. He added then: “They will have the same access as the other side o f  
the industry. In other words, they will be listened to...W e are not running the next 
Labour government for anything other than the people o f this country” (Speech to 
BBC Radio 4, 1994 quoted in McSmith, 1996: 339). The intention was nothing but 
clear. Two days later, Blair showed his ‘moralist’ face, disapproving single parents 
who bring up children on their own. To him, it was crazy to suggest that it was best 
for children to be grown up in anything other than a two-parent household. Here 
there was a message for the left too. Blair warned that some of the views on family 
associated with the left were ‘a million miles away’ from the ordinary people 
(McSmith, 1996: 339).
Since he was strictly on the path o f Kinnock and Smith, no one was 
in doubt that Blair would continue, even would speed up the modernisation o f the 
party. Such an expectation was right but also deficient because Blair not only 
culminated the modernisation process set by Klinnock and Smith, he completely 
reshaped -one would use the word ‘reversed’- the ideology of the party and placed 
it in a new location in the British political spectrum.
In very brief terms, the core o f the Blairite analysis was that the 
party had failed to understand and respond to the social and economic changes
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which had transformed Britain and the world in the last decades. ' Its programme, 
they said, its organisation and mentality were accorded to an age which is past 
now. The times when labourers composed a great section o f the population and 
allied in the form o f unions with collectivist sentiments were over. Economic and 
technological changes had provided a significant decline in the size o f the working 
class. Rising social mobility, moves to the white-collar jobs and service industries, 
and globalisation were the elements of this change. In this context, Labour had to 
be a party responsive to these changes. In other words, in order to keep up. Labour 
had to change. Conservatives, considering the aspects o f the changes occurring 
since the late 1970s, had been successful in gaining new adherents, and managed to 
remain in power, whereas Labour, overlooking these changes, had insisted on old- 
style politics, and most importantly had always ignored the middle classes. Thus, a 
new party which could attract and represent middle classes and raise their 
aspirations had to be developed.
4.2 Formation of New Labour and Clause IV
It is all too obvious that Blair would have been unable to pursue his 
project if  the appropriate groundwork had not been laid by Kinnock and Smith. 
Both ideologically and organisationally, much had been done in reversing old (left- 
inspired) policies of Labour. When he was in office, Blair already had a power
Although this gives the impression that m o d e rn ise rs  are within the revisionist tradition o f British 
left, which was mentioned in the second chapter, they are essentially out of this path as the rest o f  
this study will help to explain.
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mechanism and ideological background he would need in order to implement his
policies with less objection. Once he said that
The process o f change I have undertaken, started by my 
predecessors before me, has been to get Labour outdated policy 
perspectives and the quasi-Marxist traditions of a small part of the 
party (Speech to the annual conference o f the Federation of British 
Industry, 1995).
What was wrong under Smith, according to the Blair, was the 
slowness and moderation o f the steps and this was usually given to the personality 
oi'Smith. Now, much faster and radical steps would be taken. In this respect, what 
Blair first did was to restore the Kinnock regime (Leys and Panitch, 1997; 227). 
The meaning of this was instead o f enjoying the conventional, decentralised policy 
making mechanisms of the party, the initiative was again taken by the leadership 
which gathered a set o f professionals, spin doctors, policy advisors, image makers 
around itself^ Under Blair, as observed by many, most of these people were not 
from the Labour Party circles, or even from politics. They were in the Labour 
Party, rather they were with Tony Blair, now as a part o f their careers which started 
for example at think-tanks, media or business world  ^ (McSmith, 1996: 342)
Influenced from the success o f the (New) Democrats led by Bill 
Clinton in the United States, the Blairite team began to call their party New Labour
“ Think-Tanks, which have become popular institutions o f last decades, also play significant roles in 
the formation o f the New Labour’s ideology and policies with their ‘interesting’ discussions. Those 
are: Institute o f Public Policy, Charter 88, Demos, and Nexus. While for the last two Blair has a 
special interest and in strong relations. Charter 88, which mostly deal with rights and liberties is the 
least popular one among the m o d e rn ise rs  since it was seen as the legacy o f the New Left.
 ^ One Labour MP, in 1995, had complained: “Tony is surrounding himself with people who are 
clever, able and upper-middle class and arrogant, and who do not respect the Labour Party” (The 
Independent, 17/9/1995).
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as a symbolic gesture in order to demonstrate that the party was changing.'' For 
modernisers, nevertheless, what they needed was a much greater target in order to 
stamp their sign to the party, which will also help to persuade people that New 
Labour deserves its label. Indeed the target had already been picked. Replacement 
o f the ‘old-fashioned’ Clause IV, which was adopted in 1918, and commits Labour 
to public ownership as the ultimate aim of the party, would be a fresh start.
John Rentoul, the biographer of Blair, notes that, in the mid 1994, 
Blair had already confided his intention to rewrite Clause IV, to Gordon Brown and 
Peter Mendelson. They both agree with Blair on the necessity o f replacement 
(Rentoul, 1995: 412). However, John Prescott, who was the untitled leader of 
Labour’s conventional (unionist) wing had to be persuaded. Although at first he 
was indecisive, Prescott agreed on the condition that trade union leaders could be 
assured that there would be no more modernising party reforms before the next 
general election (Rentoul, 1995: 416).
The first move came on 4 October 1994. Pointing out that Labour 
needs ‘a modem constitution’, but without directly mentioning Clause IV, Blair 
announced that he and Prescott would present ‘a clear up-to-date statement o f the 
objects and the objectives’ of the Party (Jones, 1996: 139; Sopel, 1996: 270). With 
this, Blair had become engaged in an enterprise at which Gaitskell had failed and 
Kinnock regretted for not having done himself In December 1994, the National 
Executive Committee decided on a timetable for a special party conference at 
which the proposed constitutional change will be voted. However, Blair was not
In 1959, a revisionist Labour member, Douglas Jay, who suggested such a change in the name o f
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quite sure how much he could rely on the Conference vote in order to pass the new 
constitution. According to Shaw, when they were left to themselves, although most 
of the members would jettison the old clause, they would actually be more prone to 
pass a new one highlighting Labour’s adherence to its traditional values like social 
justice, equality, full employment (Shaw, 1996: 199). The solution o f Blair was 
quite tricky. The Conference would decide between two choices, the new one or 
the old one. There was no other alternative -such as the construction o f a 
commission to discuss new principles or prepare another Constitution- remaining 
to the Conference, except a single choice to be made between the two (Shaw, 1996: 
200)
The National Executive Committee, with some little revisions, 
passed the new clause written by Blair, to the vote o f the Conference. Within the 
period until the Conference, in order to secure the result, Blair attended a series o f  
meetings held throughout the country. He was said to have spoken to no less than 
30,000 party members in these meetings. Finally, at the special conference held on 
29 April 1995, Blair was the victor. A bit less than two-thirds o f the total voters 
had accepted the new Constitution. It reads:
The Labour Party is a democratic socialist party. It believes 
that by the strength of our common endeavour we achieve 
more than we achieve alone, so as to create for each o f us the 
means to realise our true potential and for all o f us a 
community in which power, wealth and opportunity are in
the party had been harshly protested.
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the hands o f the many not the few; where the rights we enjoy 
reflect the duties we owe and where we live together freely, 
in a spirit of solidarity, tolerance and respect.
And continues,
To these ends we work for
(a) a dynamic economy, serving the public interest, in which 
the enterprise o f the market and the rigour of competition 
are joined with the forces o f partnership and cooperation 
to produce the wealth the nation needs and the 
opportunity for all to work and prosper with a thriving 
private sector and high quality public services where 
tliose undertakings essential to the common good are 
wither owned by the public or accountable to them...
After the victory, Blair moved to make some further organisational 
changes in the party. The first one was to pursue further reductions in the weight o f  
the unions’ block vote at the Conference. This was already to be implemented once 
the total membership exceeds 300,000, as discussed in previous chapter. Secondly, 
Blair, ended trade union sponsorship of MPs. In this system, unions would supply 
some o f the expenses o f the local constituencies, but MPs would not get individual 
benefits for themselves (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 230). To Blair, this was an 
unnecessary exercise making Labour vulnerable to the Conservative press. O f 
course, it was also another way o f severing the Parliamentary Party’s relation with 
the local communities. In February 1996, this exercise was abolished. Third, Blah- 
got the Parliamentary Labour Party’s agreement to enable him to choose the party’s
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Chief Whip and Deputy Whip, which had hitherto been subjected to the votes o f 
the MPs (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 233; Coxall and Robins, 1998: 120). Fourthly, in 
order to guarantee the leadership’s authority over members and MPs, new mles o f  
conduct such as the offence o f ‘bringing the party into disrepute’ were installed 
(Leys and Panitch, 1997: 233).
The culmination in organisational change came before the 1997 
election, with the passage o f the document. Labour into Power, prepared by Tom 
.Sawyer in collaboration with Blair. It was intended to realise two objectives. First, 
it would make the extra-parliamentary party an auxiliary to the parliamentary 
party, by severing the link o f extra-parliamentary party to the National Executive 
Committee. Second, it would make the Committee subordinate to the leader (Leys 
and Panitch, 1997: 234). As a result of these changes, in the contemporary Labour 
Party, although the Conference formally continues to be sovereign, with its 
authority o f final decision, in practice, party policy is fixed by the leadership, 
through (private) discussion in the National Policy Forum which was directed by 
Joint Policy Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister and composed o f equal 
members -who were drawn, but not elected- from the National Executive 
Committee and Government (Coxall and Robins, 1999: 119). In this system, hence, 
Blair enjoys concentrated power in the leadership, through bypassing NEC and the 
conference, which have become formal partners o f the leadership team. (Coxall and 
Robins, 1999: 116).
The only area in which the National Executive Committee remained 
important is in its power to control parliamentary candidates at by-elections and for
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the general election. A subcommittee from the NEC draws up the short-lists o f 
candidates for the consideration of the local parties. The point in the selection is to 
ensure that only those who are more sympathetic to New Labour politics, and the 
leadership should be available to the decisions o f the local members^ (Seyd, 1998: 
67).
Meanwhile, the efforts to increase the number o f party members 
proved to be successful. Labour become a mass party whose membership increased 
by 140,000, from 280,000 to 420,000, between 1994 and 1997. Of course this was 
a reflection of the rising popularity of Labour at the national level. But there was 
also another goal of emphasising membership: to curb the power o f the activists, 
both at the local level and at the conference, in the party. The assumption was that 
members, unlike activists, would get less involved in the internal affairs o f party, 
would not challenge the leadership, and would also regularly pay their fees. This 
assumption proved to be correct. A study conducted in 1995 demonstrated that 
nearly half o f the newcomers joined Labour precisely because o f the Blair 
leadership, but less than half had actually attended even a branch meeting since 
signing up (Davies, 1995: 450). For at least four years the party leadership has been 
faced with no challenge from the grass-roots, and has become less dependent on 
the unions’ funds. In the end, Blair succeeded in creating a model in which 
policymaking and campaigning are performed by the leadership team and
For twenty years, both in the Conservative party and in Labour, anyone formally selected by a 
constituency party had been permitted, by the National Executive Committee, to be a Labour 
candidate regardless o f the how objectionable their views to the leader. Under Blair, this custom 
was voided. For example, Liz Davis and John Lloyd, both o f whom were properly chosen, were 
denied endorsement due to their activist backgrounds.
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professionals around them, while the members’ task becomes to assist this central 
management through their member ballots as the only way o f participation. Some 
call this as ‘massive but passive plebiscite membership’ (Perryman and Codington, 
1998: 4).
4.3 Elections and Victory
The memory of the unexpected defeat in 1992 election was crucial 
to both the subsequent evolution o f Labour and Labour’s approach to the next 
campaign. Norris writes that after 1992, Labour realised that elections are not 
usually won or lost in the official campaign, and designed a strategy for the long 
tenn (Norris, 1998: 127). Thus, the greatest part o f the election work had been done 
previously. It was professional and large budgeted, nothing was left to chance and 
everything was calculated. To Dennis Kavanagh, if  the ending o f the old Clause IV 
was a symbol o f New Labour, so also was the state o f the art media centre at 
Millbank Tower, which was established in 1995, and was borrowed the idea of a 
‘war room’ from the US Democratic Party’s campaign (Kavanagh, 1997: 537). 
The Labour campaign contained a number of personnel imported from the US. For 
instance, from early 1996, Stan Greenberg, who was Clinton’s pollster, helped to 
frame questions and conduct regression analysis o f the private polling which was 
organised by Philip Gould and Deborah Matkinson o f the Labour Party (Kavanagh: 
537; Norris: 127). Labour had also carefully examined the electoral strategies o f 
Democratic Party, which provided them two successive election wins. Peter 
Mendelson, an ex-television producer who then became the minister without
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portfolio in Blair government, was responsible for the management and co­
ordination o f media relations, and advertisement.
Tight control was characteristic o f the whole campaign in which 
some elements of authoritarianism could even be seen. Party members were not 
allowed to speak to the media before the leadership was informed about the 
content. During the proclamation of official party policies -which were in many 
cases meant the reversal o f previous pledges- they were often announced first in the 
media, in order to make internal opposition difficult since, in the media, any 
opposition would be treated as an evidence of split, which none o f the party 
members could dare in the middle o f the campaign (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 239). 
It is needless to say that most o f the new pledges were barely debated at party 
conferences.
Labour was extremely successful in using the information 
technology to explicate itself and reach the electorate. Developing strong relations 
with the media was an integral part of the campaign. This reached such a stage that 
save for the hard-core conservatives like Daily Telegraph, Daily Express and Daily 
Mail, formerly conservative media declared support to Labour. The most obvious 
examples were the tabloid Sun and the right-wing The Times, owned by the media 
emperor Rupert Murdoch^. Therefore, it was rare easily to find such negative 
headings as these:
 ^ O f course, Blair’ visit to the Murdoch’s N ew s C o rp o ra tio n  In te r n a tio n a l in Australia, one o f the 
centres o f global media empire, and his warm relations with Murdoch were decisively important in 
this affiliation.
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WARNING
A Labour government will lead to higher mortgage payments. 
There is no doubt about it. Interest rates will rise within days of 
Kinnock entering Number Ten {Daily Mail, 7/April/1992).
Or,
If Kinnock wins today will the last person to leave Britain please 
turn out the lights’ (Sun, 9/April/1992)
Instead o f those one would see:
Sun Backs Blair: Give A Chance to Change (Sun ? /April/1997)
Labour’s primary message to the electorate was that: We have 
changed, we are modernised. Therefore, let us lead and change the country. The 
draft manifesto (1996) was titled "New Labour, New Life for Britain ’, and the main 
manifesto was "New Labour: Because Britain Deserves Better' (1987). In the draft. 
Labour had already dropped most of its earlier pledges on the issues like taxation, 
public spending, unions and crime, which proved to be in contradiction with the 
new route o f the party. The main one was more sophisticated, and was designed to 
focus on five specific pledges: cutting class sizes for under-seven-years olds, fast- 
track punishments for young offenders, reduction in the National Health Service 
waiting lists, moving 250,000 young unemployed into work, and cutting VAT on
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domestic heating fuel, together with the commitments to low inflation, low taxation 
and limited budget (The Labour Party Election Manifesto, 1997).
Looking at the election campaign and looking at what they offered 
to Britain, one could see that there barely remained a difference between the 
Conservative Party and the Labour Party. Labour avoided, and explicitly rejected, 
almost all o f its points which had constituted the themes o f former elections. It was 
a fact that the originality o f Labour was in a steady decline since the mid 1980s, 
and it was accommodating the middle ground, but it was the first time Labour was 
strictly against even tax increases, or had no objection to the Grant Maintained 
Schools which it once promised to abolish. More interestingly. Labour was 
explicitly announcing that it had no objection to the current economic management 
in terms o f principles. In the end, once Labour had nullified what it once defended, 
the race between Labour and the Conservatives, turned out to be a matter o f  
competence, rather than ideology or principles. As it was put in an Economist 
article, voters were to be asked to choose between five more years o f conservatism 
under Major and five more years of conservatism under Blair. And what made New 
Labour unstoppable was that it has turned Tory (The Economist, September 1996). 
The Labour Party was now seeking to place itself as the natural party o f  
government in British politics. In this scene, only Liberal Democrats, as one o f the 
tliree biggest parties, deserved to be called an ‘opposition party’, with their distinct 
agenda for the British economy and the state.
Colin Leys, in a brilliant article, summarises the strategies that 
governed the policy thinking and overall campaign o f New Labour: The first, he
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writes, was that ‘next election had to be won’, in order either to save the country 
from another conservative government, or to prevent the collapse o f Labour. For 
the leadership o f the party, this meant that Labour had to adjust itself to the voters 
whose ideas had been shaped by long lasting conservative administration. 
Therefore, the group o f voters who could be won for the first time was the main 
target . Second, in the formation of the voters’ preferences, it had been not only the 
new right propaganda in effect but also the crucial changes in the job structure, 
changes in the public consideration o f the state, disappearance o f class as a way o f  
expressing collective identity was important. Third, contemporary media make it 
hard for new policies to be appropriately proposed and rationally debated. 
Therefore, tight control o f all policy announcements was a must, and meanwhile 
the image of the party in public had to carefully constructed. Finally, since the aim 
was to win at least two successive elections in order to ensure the success in long­
term policies such as education and training. Labour had to gather the acceptance 
of capital as the suitable even the preferred party for the British economy. This, at 
first, implied taking for granted the rules and restraints put by global capitalism, 
avoiding Keynesian economics. Second, corporate taxation and regulatory burdens 
had to be kept low with the low wage increases (Leys, 1997: 21-22).
The formula - at least the electoral part - did work. On 1 May 1997, 
with what some call landslide, the Labour Party won the elections. It polled 44 per 
cent o f the total vote which meant a 10 per cent rise, and gained 419 seats in
’ In a similar vein, Sopel (1997) notes that the very voters Blair needed to attract to win were 
conservative with a small ‘c ’, cautious and those who still harbour doubts about what a Labour 
govemment would do. They were aspirant middle classes whom Mrs Thatcher won over with her 
popular capitalism.
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Parliament. This massive swing in popularity from Conservative to Labour was the 
largest registered by any party since 1945. Conservatives polled 31 per cent, and 
had 165 seats, slightly more than half the 324 seats they had held before the 
election. Liberal Democrats’ rate of vote remained almost the same, 17 per cent, 
compared to 18 per cent in 1992, but they doubled their number o f seats (46) in 
Parliament.
4.4 The Mastery of New Labour
Now, let us focus on the substantial features o f New Labour. At the 
centre o f our analysis will be economic policy o f New Labour. Next, the social 
policy, then the welfare policy o f New Labour which was accorded in tune with the 
economic policy will be examined. As it was shown in the third chapter, since the 
mid 1980s Labour had already introduced a series o f exercises -whether successfiil 
or not- for changing its policies. Under Kinnock and Smith, let alone the 
abandonment o f unilateral nuclear disarmament. Labour had already given up its 
two former pledges: (re)nationalisation o f the privatised utilities, and the 
restoration of trade union immunities. Full employment was also dropped from 
among the priorities*, largely because Labour had announced support for the 
membership to Exchange Rate Mechanism.^ In this context. Labour was confined 
to the management o f British economy, in a way that can no longer be defined as 
mixed one. The only crucial difference in economic policy was the tax increases
* Although, the Commission for Social Justice had attached special importance to full employment, 
its impact on the Party’s official policy had remained vague.
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which were released and defended by Smith; however since they were thought to 
be responsible for the electoral defeat in 1992, in the modernisers’ eye, taxation 
policy was to be one of the targets to be changed. And as a conventional notion o f  
the party equality, was being perceived within a more liberal context, equality o f  
opportunity. However, looking at the changes as a whole, one could see that this 
exercise of Labour was not phrased in strictly and coherently defined ideological 
terms, but more in pragmatic terms as an electoral strategy. Now what was left to 
Blair was to complete the ideological repositioning o f Labour at the centre o f the 
British political spectrum.
4.4.1 New Economic Policy
New Labour’s economic policy was illustrated in a series o f 
documents, in the speeches and pamphlets of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, 
articulated between 1995 and 1997.’° The main theme in all is that the world has 
undergone a fundamental economic change and old policies have become 
irrelevant to new realities. The most powerful o f these realities are said to be 
globalisation, post-Fordism, post-industrialism, and basically free and flexible 
markets. Thus, before all, the era of Keynesian economics and public intervention 
was closed and free market and its principles are the primary rules o f conduct in the 
new era. The role o f the government is to provide the essential framework for
’ Interestingly enough, after not such a long time Labour declared its support, ERM proved to be 
disaster in 1992 and the Tory government, having joined in it 1990, left from the ERM.
The most important o f those are: V ision  f o r  G ro w th : A N e w  I n d u s tr ia l S tr a te g y  f o r  B r ita in  (1996), 
and A N e w  E c o n o m ic  F u tu re  f o r  B r ita in  (1996); and o f course the 1997 Manifesto, N e w  L a b o u r :  
B e c a u s e  B r ita in  D e s e r v e s  B e tte r  (1997). References to the lectures, speeches and books will be 
given in the text.
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competitive markets. This was argued to be so-called new model o f intervention m 
which state and market are conceptualised as complementary partners.
4.4.1.a We Are All Globalised Now
The understanding that we do live in a globalised world is one o f the 
keys to the New Labour economic approach in general, and to the abandonment of 
Keynesian economics in particular. (Driver and Martell, 1998: 42). We must 
recognise, Blair says, “that the UK is situated in the middle o f an active global 
market for capital -  a market which is less subject to regulation today...Since it is 
inconceivable that the UK would want to withdraw unilaterally from this global 
market-place, we must instead adjust our policies to its existence” (The Mais 
Lecture, 1995). A country, for Blair, has to dismantle barriers to competition and 
accept the disciplines o f the international economy (Speech in Tokyo, 1996). Thus, 
the argument continues, in a global economy, within which the capital is highly 
mobile and the demand is subjected to the factors beyond national boundaries, 
governments can neither control capital nor manage demand, but can deal with the 
supply side o f the economy. The key here is the competition, since if  being a part 
of globalised world is the first step, keeping up within the global race is the second 
one. “To compete in the long term”, says Blair, “a nation must also constantly be 
investing in new capacity and above all in the flexibility and aptitude o f its people” 
(Speech in Tokyo, 1996). This would be done by ensuring labour quality, and 
providing skilled labour force to the needs of capital. Of course, what is called 
flexible labour market is a sine qua non o f this agenda because skilled labour force
84
and flexible labour markets (which also mean cheap labour) are the keys for global 
competitiveness.
4.4.1.b Living in p o st times
As a part o f the globalisation rhetoric, post-Fordist and post­
industrialist arguments occupy a significant place in the formation o f Labour’s 
supply-side economics. Post-Fordism offers a transformation from the Fordist 
world of mass production through economies o f scale oriented to long-term 
production of standardised goods by the labour o f semi-skilled and unskilled 
workers. What occurs under post-Fordism is the manipulation of flexible 
technology, articulated by skilled and flexible workforce for the short-run 
production of highly diverse goods to diversified markets. In this context, markets 
and consumers, rather than production process, become the determinants o f the 
economic cycle. Post-industrialism (see; Daniel Bell, and Alan Tourine), another 
tenet, suggests that there has occurred a shift from manufacturing industries to the 
service economies in which information/knowledge play decisive roles. The 
conventional definition o f class based on the certain position of people to the 
means o f production and their place in the relations o f production is argued to be 
obsolete. Therefore, it was said, we can not speak o f class in general and working 
class in particular which is disappearing and leaving its place to the middle classes.
New Labour, write Driver and Martell, sees its supply-side policies 
as uniquely matched to a post-industrial and post-Fordist economy in which 
individual skill, knowledge, information and creativity are crucial for success and
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growth (Driver and Martell, 1998: 44). Of course, these theories also provide a 
powerful intellectual support to New Labour which aims to completely give up its 
image o f (labourer) class party.
Indeed, many o f these ideas had already been on the agenda o f  
British left. Both post-Fordism and post-industrialism were hotly discussed within 
the journal Marxism Today, through the series o f New Times, in the 1980s. 
Considering these changes, Marxism Today sought to draw a new perspective and 
route to the British left for the times in which working class politics entered into 
the crisis since their social base was disappearing. It was half right and half wrong. 
One the one hand, it is undeniable that what is explored in these post-anything 
theories highlight stmctural transformations. One the other, however, looking at the 
changes solely in terms of the ‘systemic or functional consequences o f 
technological innovations in which dominant technology allied to an appropriate 
form of social organisation was held to give shape to a whole social system’, 
reduces the analysis to a socio-technical determinism (Rustin, 1994: 73) in which 
power relations are strictly unproblematised and the fact that these transformations 
carry the signs o f class strategies as well as technological improvements are widely 
underestimated. Therefore what is at the stake is not just a set o f technological 
developments. Post-Fordism flourished significantly not because the technology 
was developed only, but also it enabled employers to use a divided workforce at the 
lowest price. Rogers and Streeck notes that.
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[Post-Fordist strategies] characteristically feature more advanced 
attention to logistics and quality, and more intensive utilisation o f  
front-line workers, usually organised in teams. But they are 
associated with just as fierce downward pressures on wages, and just 
as much hostility to collective worker representation. World-wide, 
both ‘sweating’ and ‘lean’ firms are increasing their market 
share...[and] they have become the icons o f ‘flexible’ production, 
with most o f the costs of flexible adjustment to unstable demand 
visited on workers (Rogers and Streeck, 1994: 131).
However, these debates do not mean much to New Labour since it 
closes the doors to getting involved in any attempt to go beyond the orthodox 
interpretations of these transformations. Indeed these debates about post­
industrialism, post-Fordism reminds us that class analysis is an unavoidable 
analytical tool for both making of the unorthodox political science as well as the 
articulation o f left-wing politics. However, the point is to be able to look at the 
matter at the widest sense i.e. in terms of labour and labouring process within the 
capitalist economy. If we define the frame of working class in terms o f the people 
working in the industrial factory, then inevitably working class appears to come to 
an end, and we would argue that class does not matter. But, when the emphasis is 
on the notion o f labour which is still subjected to unequal relations o f power and 
exploitation, then class still matters. Therefore, the matter is to catch the changing 
forms o f class relations. When this is done appropriately class can serve as a highly
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explanatory conceptual tool in order to analyse either the service or information 
sector employee as well as the worker in the Toyota factory.”
4.4.1.c Golden Rule of the Government
The second implication o f globalisation for New Labour is on the 
proper rules of conduct for government. Here the key is again global 
competitiveness. Today, the role of the government, according to Blair, is not to 
command but to facilitate. Government, he says, “should not run business, but nor 
should it duck its responsibilities where these are necessary to fulfil the national 
interest” (Speech to the annual conference of the Federation o f British Industry, 
1995) The responsibility of the government, in addition to the supply-side policies 
mentioned in above pages, should be the creation o f an attractive framework for 
companies. Therefore, governments have to keep inflation and taxation at the 
lowest levels, especially favourable to the competitor countries in the global system 
(Speech to the annual conference of the Federation o f British Industry, 1995). 
Labour, during the election campaign pledged tough rules for government spending 
and borrowing, ensuring low inflation which is not higher than 2.5 per cent in a 
year, improving competition and revitalising private finance without state 
intervention, all o f which were supposed to bring growth in an economy through 
well functioning free markets. Before the general election, Gordon Brown, now
" In an attempt to use class in order to understand a modem capitalist system, Cannadine (1999) 
offers to conceptualise class through three lines. First, class can be conceptualised as a hierarchy o f  
status and rank. Second, as class estates linked to economic and power functions; an elite, a 
professional managerial class, a mass o f wage-earners and underclass o f unemployed. Third, in the 
Marxist sense: the propertied and proletariat.
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Chancellor, declared that a Labour government would neither increase rates o f  
income tax in the lifetime of a Parliament, nor would it shift the Conservative 
government’s spending commitments'^ (Seyd, 1998: 61). The ‘golden rule’ that 
public borrowing would be used to finance only investment and not consumption, 
and the budget should balance over the economic cycle, has become the motto o f  
New Labour (Mandelson and Liddle, 1996: 80; Driver and Martell, 1998: 63). In 
Brown’s words: “the war on inflation is a Labour war...Brown’s law is that the 
government will only borrow to invest, public debt will remain stable and the cost 
effectiveness o f public spending must be proved...nobody should doubt my iron 
resolve for stability and fiscal prudence” (Brown, 1995 quoted in Leys and Panitch, 
1997: 250). In brief, macro economic stability and low inflation, through 
inactivism on the demand side, and activism on the supply-side, constitute the basis 
of New Labour’s economic policy.
New Labour has been extremely sensitive to end the ‘high tax’ 
image o f the party at the domestic level, which was believed to have lost the 1992 
election for Labour. Taxes had to be nationally low and internationally 
competitive. It was ceaselessly announced that ‘the days o f reflex tax and spend 
politics are over, and the aim is “fair taxes, not high taxes” and “there would be no 
return to penal rates o f high taxation”. Labour even pledged to reduce starting rate 
of income tax to 10 per cent as a longer-term goal (Coxall and Robins, 1999: 110). 
In his first budget, then, Gordon Brown, adhered to the pledges. His major source;.;
This plan was regarded with doubt even in the City as implausibly strict, even. Labour was said to 
tie its hands to an unprecedented degree (See: The Economist, Special Election Issue, 1997).
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of new revenue were the long-anticipated windfall tax, to raise £4.8 billion over 
two years, and abolition of the tax rebates received by pension funds on dividends 
on their investments, to raise £6.2 billion in the same period (Anderson and Mann, 
1997: 61). Meanwhile, as was promised, the Labour govermnent has reduced the 
VAT on fuel, brought about a small cut in corporation tax, and has not raised 
income tax at all.
4.4.1.d The Labour Party, Business World and Trade Unions
The Labour Party under Blair, gave a primary importance to gain 
the tmst o f capital in general, and the City in particular, by ensuring that their 
businesses would not be interrupted, rather improved. Before the 1997 elections 
Blair and colleagues attended a lot of meetings and receptions with business people 
-som e satirically call these prawn-cocktail- to explain their commitment to work in 
partnership with business.'^ (Driver and Martell, 1998: 67). Before the election, 
Blair declared a five point manifesto oriented to prove that New Labour was ‘the 
entrepreneur’s champion’. He said: “We want Britain to be a great place to do 
business. We want business in Britain to succeed and deliver healthy growth, good 
profits, rising living standards and more jobs’’ (The Guardian, 12/April/1997).
The five pledges were:
1. Stable prices with an inflation target of 2.5 per cent or less, 
coupled with tough rules on borrowing and spending and no rise 
in income tax.
After the elections, as a symbolic gesture, Lord Simon, the former BP chairman, was appointed as 
the trade minister.
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2. A new impetus for the Private Finance Initiative to speed up 
improvements to the infrastructure.
3. To upgrade the quality o f workforce by cutting class sizes, 
setting new targets for literacy and numeracy, and setting up a 
University for Industry for lifelong learning.
4. To spearhead the fight for more competition in the single market 
while keeping an open mind on the single currency.
5. Full backing to small business, with legislation to end late 
payments to small firms and give them extra support to help 
them grow.
New Labour has not only turned its scepticism towards the private 
sector into a deep tnjst, it also wishes to overcome the old dichotomies like 
nationalisation/privatisation, intervention/deregulation, with what is called public 
private partnership. Although at the first sight this might imply the creation o f a 
public sector oriented to public interest instead o f profit-making, what it actually 
proposes is business-friendly state policy. For instance, it undertakes the state 
supported investment in areas that exceed the power of the private sector, or which 
the private sector is less willing to fund, such as Research and Development, 
transportation, or high-tech industry. Blair is very cautious to stress that it does not 
mean a replacement o f private sector by public, which might be reminiscent o f the 
Old Labour policy. He says that “while it may be a mix of public and private 
enterprise. It can not be government at all but the private sector given a competitive 
framework in which to exist...that can deliver service” (Speech to the Newscorp 
Leadership Conference in Australia, 1995). In this context, overall, Thompso;;
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observes that, the government’s role in the partnership becomes conceived in term 
of framework provision, providing the institutional and legislative structure within 
which business and finance can function freely, and competitively (Thompson, 
1996: 45). Actually, Labour’s pre-election guarantee*'* to business that a Labour 
government would be cautious and responsive to the demands and the needs o f the 
private sector clarifies what public-private partnership would mean at its crudest: 
Instead of the three cornered corporatism of the post-war era, here are the roots o f 
new two cornered corporatism of the post-modern times, from which labourers and 
unions are successfully excluded.
Expectedly, the project of wooing Middle England and the City 
would have been deficient if  Labour had not altered its links with the trade unions. 
Severing the link with them, as was done by organisational changes mentioned in 
previous pages, would not be enough. During the 1980s and the 1990s, as the 
power of the unions in the party’s decision-making mechanism was increasingly 
severed, policy commitments to them were also diminished (Leys and Panitch, 
1997: 254). Then, Labour under Blair moved to take a relative counter position to 
them.'^ Before the elections it was repeatedly stated that “New Labour is the 
political arm o f none other than the British people as a whole” (The Election 
Manifesto, 1997).
In opposition. Labour had rejected the report Working Life, 
including the enlargement of employment law to all workers, effective protection
The ultimate expression o f this was embodied in the slogan: “ We are a pro-business party” 
Indeed, taking a counter position to unions had started under Kiimock who harshly criticised and 
counteracted the M in e r s ' S tr ik e  between 1984-85, which ended with the victory o f the government.
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o f workers’ rights and fairness at work, regulation o f working hours in accordance 
with European Union standards. The answer was direct: “The Party would not be 
responding to impossible demands” (The Independent, 4/9/1996). Blair engaged in 
no attempt to reverse the anti-union legislation o f the 1980s; in the election 
campaign it was even declared that Labour government would leave British law as 
the most restrictive on trade unions in the Western world (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 
254), and there would be no simple pressing o f the rewind button in union 
legislation (Blair’s Speech to the GMB conference, 1995). Sometimes Blair’s 
approach was more cautious. He stated that the unions would get things they want 
-  a minimum wage, the Social chapter and recognition- (The Guardian, 25/3/1997), 
but, this, according to Blair must not lead to rigidity or to inflexibility in labour 
markets (Speech in Tokyo, 1996). As a result, although new government passed 
Britain’s first minimum wage law, at $6 an hour, and signed the E.U. Social 
Chapter last year it also came into conflict with unions since the Labour 
administration confirmed that government would oppose the legislation to require 
employers to set up consultation procedures for the workforce (The 
Guardian, 17.3.1998).
The new right was hostile to trade unions, which were regarded as 
collectivist, socialist organisations that were seriously disrupting the running o f 
market forces. The argument was that unions distort supply and demand in the 
labour market through upward pressure on wages and reduce investment. As 
different from the prices and incomes policy of the post-war era which included the 
unions in economic management and controlling inflation, new right monetaris·/;
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relied heavily on the marginalisation of trade unions. Thatcher governments, 
between 1980 and 1990, acted through step by step legislation, in order to further 
restrict union freedoms. When Thatcher left the leadership, union members were 
limited to secondary picketing, the closed shop and eligibility for social security 
as well as new protection for non-strikers (Coxall and Robins, 1998: 234-235). The 
ultimate aim was to transfonn trade unions into workplace representatives instead 
of organised interest groups acting in behalf of a class.
It is understandable for a party, which somehow has to reach to a 
wider electorate in order to win election, to reconsider its links with the 
organisations which by their nature represent and defend the interests o f a class. 
Especially under a hegemonic construction in which people are motivated to think 
more in individual terms and distanced from class identity, such an attitude might 
be important to an extent. Furthermore, some criticisms which have been made 
against the unions, to a degree, might be rightful, especially on their oligarchic and 
undemocratic structures or narrow visions. However, while attempting to 
democratise the unions, making them more accountable and responsible, and 
seeking to break the hegemony through such a project would be an appropriate 
option for a party carrying the brand labour, New Labour is again in full 
accommodation with the Tory legacy. Let us finish this section with an interesting 
example. Consider these words: “It has been recognised that an increase in the 
labourer wages which does not pave the way to inflation and curb the power o f a 
firm, is possible only by developing the effectiveness and especially global 
competitiveness of the firm.” There is no reason not to think that these are the
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words o f Blair since it completely fits his discourse. However, these word belong 
to Coşkun K rca, a famous Turkish conservative MP and colunmist, and this 
quotation is from a recent article in which K rca explains why unions are evil 
organisations and they are dangerous to the existence o f the state (Sabah, 
16/August/1999).
4.5 Political Economy of New Labour: A Theoretical 
Analysis
Although it is a decisive dimension o f the New Labour’s economic 
policy, analysing the matter solely in terms o f globalisation would be deficient 
since it does not fully illuminate the real ground on which the transformation of 
economic policy has occurred. Therefore, we offer to analyse New Labour’s 
economic policy in terms of one o f the basic themes o f political economy: state- 
market relation.
In the post-war era, the basic difference between the classical free 
market {laissez-fairre) view and Keynesianism was the emphasis on the role o f  
government and its relation to the market in the management of the economy. The 
classical free market view rests on the principles that a)prices and wages are 
relatively flexible; b)aggregate supply is determined independently o f aggregate 
demand; c) people’ price and wage expectations adjust rapidly to shifts in 
aggregate demand; and thus djfiscal and monetary policy are ineffective in 
changing the levels o f output, employment and growth. In this context, govemmeric 
interventions are nonsense, and the market should be allowed to function ffeei/
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according to its own rules. (Deans, 1998). However, the Keynesian perspective, 
granting the market as the basic mechanism for organising economic transactions 
and effective resource allocation, did hold the opinion that capitalist economies are 
inherently unstable and market forces suffer rigidities and co-ordination failures 
preventing them from restoring equilibrium, full employment and potential output 
level. In this sense, it rests on the belief that a) prices and wages are inflexible 
downwards; b)aggregate supply depends on the level o f aggregate demand; 
c)people’s expectations of prices and wages adjust slowly to shifts in aggregate 
demand; and thus d)fiscal and monetary policies are effective tools in altering 
levels o f output, employment and growth (Deans, 1998). In this respect, the 
argument on the market as a self-adjusting mechanism does not make sense and 
government intervention to stabilise the economy is essential.
Indeed, the new right relies on the post-war reformulation o f 
classical economics that is called neo-classical. This analysis is classical since it 
assumes that wage and price flexibility restore the economy to a position of  
potential output. It is also new since it supposes that this wage and price flexibility 
is almost instantaneous due to the operation of rational expectations. In this system 
government cannot directly influence output and employment by monetary or fiscal 
policy, as the effects o f these measures will be anticipated and counteracted 
(Deans, 1998). What government has to do, then, is to reduce public debt, 
maintain a limited budget and control inflation. ‘Intervention’ is left to the supply
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side measures like liberalisation and deregulation in order to develop market 
flexibility.'^ Recall that New Labour speaks the tongue o f supply-side.
As is well known, Keynes himself was a liberal, and not a supporter 
of Labour, but Keynesian economics, with justifiable reasons, fit well with the 
sceptical and critical position of Labour towards the free market and its egalitarian 
(distributive) aspirations. Furthermore, the Labour Party had achieved to settle the 
logic o f its project (necessity of intervention) as the basis for the management o f  
the British economy for a long period. Three decades later, the first denouncement 
of Keynesian economics came in 1976 by Denis Healey, the Chancellor under the 
Callaghan government, in the face of an international economic crisis. Following 
this, Tory governments swept what remained from Keynesianism in the name o f 
neo-classical economics, and installed this as the new basis o f economic 
management. As a response, following the defeat o f the New Left which hopelessly 
battled against Thatcherism, Labour, in the mid 1980s, moved to accept the 
superiority o f free market over public initiative, then under Blair, positively
The neo-classical view is also backed by the concept o f th e  n a tu ra l r a te  o f  u n e m p lo ym en t,  
developed by Friedman (1968). The argument says, contrary to the Phillips curve argument which 
places a strong correlation between inflation and unemployment, each economy enjoys a certain 
natural rate o f unemployment which is determined by the supply-side factors. If unemployment is 
above the natural rate, inflation would fall until the equilibrium point; if it was below the natural 
rate, inflation would rise. Therefore, the requirements, as can be expected, are minimal and non 
interventionist state, privatisation, ensuring flexible labour markets, and keeping the budget lov/ 
through lesser public spending; all o f which in turn are said to pave the way to low inflation and low 
natural rate o f unemployment. For more than two decades, then, new right governments 
manipulated th e  n a tu ra l r a te  o f  u n em p lo ym en t, in order to justify their policies oriented to cope with, 
inflation. And the statement o f the Mervyn King, deputy governor o f the Bank of England, 
demonstrated that the same idea continues to be in charge in the management o f British economy. 
He said: “Looking ahead, some rise in unemployment is likely later in the year, and is probably 
necessary to contain pressure on wages and earning” (The Guardian, 20/August/1998).
97
welcomed it together with the neo-classical economics now wrapped in a rhetoric 
of globalisation which denies other courses of action.
To sum up, the passage from Keynesian economics to the neo­
classical echelons highlights the background of New Labour’s economic policy.*’ 
Once this is noted, then it is much easier to place the policy details -such as the 
emphasis on supply-side, limited public spending- into their places.
However, having explored this does not still explain why this set o f  
policies, which originally belong to another party, namely the Conservative Party, 
brought a party which had challenged these policies for decades, to the ranks o f  
government. In other words, what made New Labour economics appear to promise 
a different trajectory than Conservative economics? In order to find the answer we 
have to clarify what New Labour added, or asserts to add, to the Thatcherite free- 
market view. Only after this point is fully recognised, the remaining questions can 
be answered.
Indeed we have already provided the elements o f what New Labour 
added to the Thatcherite free-market view. We showed that New Labour enjoys a 
rhetoric o f supply-side economics. In a time when basic supply-side measures o f  
neo-liberalism, precisely deregulation and liberalisation reached to their edges, i.e. 
fulfilled their tasks, what is left to New Labour is to add a new set o f supply-side 
measures. These are formulated as to provide stable and competitive market
Although there are efforts to reformulate it at especially the European level, it is true that 
Keynesian economics may not be an adequate answer for contemporary economy, but it is equally 
tme that warmed over neo-classical economics can not be a policy option for those who argue that 
whose replacement with Tories would make difference.
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conditions, ensuring the flow o f skilled labour to the market, and being responsive 
to the needs and demands of capital. When we analyse this in terms o f the positions 
on the state-market relation, it can be easily recognised that New Labour seeks to 
formulate a complementary relation between the state and market. However, the 
point is that this complementary relation, unlike Keynesianism is not based on the 
fallacy or inadequacy of free markets, but on the role o f the state to ensure the 
well-functioning o f them. What is implied with the supply-side economics is the 
daily policy dimension of this understanding, and what is implied with the golden, 
rule for the government is a set o f essential measures in order to keep the domestic 
economy stable. It is argued, only such a set o f policies can help country to 
integrate into the global economy at the widest level.
With this section, we have finished investigating the dimensions o f  
the New Labour’s economic policy. The following subsection attempts to explain 
why this economic agenda could gain the acceptance o f both masses (widely the 
middle classes) and British business circles. In order to explain this, we need to 
place it within the political economy of Britain in the last two decades since the 
conditions prepared the victory o f New Labour lay in it.
4.5.1 The “End” of Thatcherism and The Economics of Opportunity
Perhaps we should begin by recalling some parts from the new
Constitution o f Labour which had replaced the old Clause IV.
...and for all o f us a community in which power, wealth
opportunity are in the hands o f  the many not the f e w . ..
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...in which the enterprise o f  the market and the rigour o f
competition are joined with the forces o f partnership and 
cooperation to produce the wealth the nation needs and the 
opportunity for all to work...
The notion o f opportunity is the buzzword o f New Labour’s 
ideology. It was stated everywhere and in every context from nursery education to 
health, from transportation to employment. The offer was simple: unlike what 
occun-ed under Thatcherism, New Labour, without giving up the neo-classical 
economics and economic individualism of the new-right, suggests a change in the 
exercise of the new-right economics. In Driver and MartelTs words, to the masses, 
it offers a new conception o î social justice on the basis o f ‘equality o f opportunity.’ 
And to the capital, it offers a developed structure to make profit. To understand the 
meaning of this offer, we need to begin with an analysis o f Thatcherism.
Despite the neutral-sounding winner takes all rhetoric o f Tory 
individualism, in the final analysis, the new right implied redistribution (of wealth) 
towards the better off (Philo, 1994; 49). Privatisation, which actually meant the 
transformation of public monopolies into private monopolies is one obvious 
example. Or, the conservative obsession with lower taxation and limited public 
spending, together with the low wage policy, also meant the redistribution o f  
money towards the rich. Although the powerful egalitarian ethos o f the post-war 
era had been an obstacle to the implementation o f those immediately at the
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beginning Thatcher administration, finally, achieved to transform social democratic 
reallocation system (in which redistribution was towards the lower income groups) 
into a new form of capitalism on the basis o f neo-classical economics. Tough 
monetaiy and fiscal policy, anti-unionism, free markets, and deregulation were the 
essential means o f this project. Meanwhile, as a strong hegemonic project with a 
relatively coherent ideology, Thatcherism influenced and reshaped the world-view 
of large groups -including all classes, but especially the middle class as the primary 
carriers (although not the main beneficiaries) o f the new settlement, by invoking 
their imagination of being better-off somehow and by creating a there is no 
alternative conjecture which was difficult to oppose especially in the absence o f a 
liberal or socialist counter project.
However, this project was not to continue boundlessly. It inevitably 
had its limits and as it advanced, it brought its own end since the system it created 
was also being transformed and the outcomes were being revealed. As successfully 
put by Rustin, in the end, the programme of the new right conflicted and confiised 
the immediate interests o f the middle class, together with the long-term interests o f 
capitalism (Rustin, 1994: 86). This is to say that, at one side, the middle classes o f 
Britain began to realise that Thatcherism had not much worked in their favour 
since, compared to the ten per cent of population having the bulk o f the national 
wealth, middle classes’ relative position and wealth, similar to the poorer section o f  
society, was highly weakened while their ambitions, which were largely shaped by 
Thatcherite market culture remained strong.
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Meanwhile, at the other side, the overall consequence o f the 
continuous redistribution o f wealth widely towards a minority o f society implied 
the violation o f the basic mechanism o f capitalism, namely the exchange relation. 
In other words, in the end, “there has been deep confusion in the project of the 
radical right between the technical or functional objective of realising the potential 
benefits o f an expanded system o f market exchange, and the social objective 
strengthening the power of propertied class and defeating the forces resistant to it” 
(Rustin, 1994: 85). This was in contradiction to the well-functioning o f capitalism 
since at its crudest, the nature o f capitalism is based on the continuous 
accumulation of wealth, not merely “on its distribution to the advantage o f the 
successful and to the disadvantage of the rest” (Rustin, 1994: 74). In other words, 
in the end the new-right economics began to work also against the interests o f those 
who once benefited much from them, since the overall cycling o f exchange was 
slowed down. Recall that economists call such a case recession and during the 
years o f Major, Britain highly suffered from it.
To sum up, we argue that proficient functioning o f Thatcherism i.e. 
succeeding in its goals, brought itself to its own “end”, both as a specific 
hegemonic project, and as a specific economic agenda. And this condition is the 
post-Thatcherite vacuum.
However, we should not go much farther. The Post-Thatcherite 
vacuum is a condition whose parameters are heavily defined by Thatcherite 
exercise and hegemony of last two decades. And especially at the absence o f an 
anti-Thatcherite project which was defined by totally different parameters and
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offers an alternative ‘vision’ post-Thatcherite vacuum does not imply the complete 
reversal o f Thatcherism. Rather the vice versa since a moderate project which 
would fill this vacuum had to satisfy two conditions: First, as a part o f the strategy 
towards the middle class, a post-Thatcherite project has to be developed on the 
basis of the sort o f (economic) individualism shaped by Thatcherism. In other 
words, we are all customers, clients, entrepreneurs now, instead o f employees, 
workers, officers. Second, as a part of the strategy towards the City and capital, 
principal mechanisms of the establishment, free market and neo-classical 
economics, and low (corporate) taxation, had to remain untouched; rather, they 
would be warmly welcomed. And, as it was shown in this paper. New Labour has 
successfully satisfied these conditions. In other words, it successfully perceived this 
vacuum, and instead o f developing to counter agenda which would be more 
difficult to popularise, it filled the vacuum by accommodating what remained from 
Thatcherism, and promoted its agenda which appeared  to remedy both the pains o f  
British middle class and British capitalism as a whole.
Therefore, with a strong emphasis on free market, and within the 
parameters of neo-classical economics. New Labour, through its supply-side 
measures, offers a capitalist system in which individuals will be given more 
opportunity (better education, employment etc.) -which the Thatcherite 
understanding of free market did not provide- to have individual wealth on the 
basis o f his/her merit and hardwork’ .^ And it promises that their wealth would not 
be taxed for redisributionary aims neither towards the better off (Thatcherism) nor
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towards the poor (Keynesianism). In other words, if  the equality o f opportunity, (or 
inclusion as Blair likes to say) is one aspect o f this project, the warranty on the 
individual manipulation o f what was gained from this opportunity is the second 
aspect. “I want a tax regime”, says Blair, “where through their hard-work, risk­
taking, and success people can become wealthy” (Speech to the Annual Conference 
of the Confederation o f British Industry, 1995).
The whole rhetoric of New Labour -supply side reforms, 
enskillment, lifelong learning, fair competition, and low taxes- are oriented to 
persuade people to this agenda o f individual opportunity and full (individual) 
control o f its outcomes.
In the other part of this agenda which was oriented towards the 
capital. New Labour does not only ensure that private capital would not be 
disrupted, it also adds that private capital would be listened to and responded to-as 
the notion of public private partnership implies- and would be given the chance o f  
being in better conditions with more profit since the government. New Labour 
promises, would seek to develop infrastructure for the competitive market, keep 
corporate taxes low, directly support and invest in areas where capital needs help, 
and ensure a skilled labour force within flexible labour market conditions. By this 
way, not in terms of Thatcherite redistribution, but in terms o f overall efficiency, 
productivity and flexibility, capital would again be able to make money.
18 Perhaps, at the roots o f the fact that New Labour distanced itself from monarchy, lords, 
hereditary peers, and supported constitutional change, lies this meritocratic logic.
It should also be noted that in an era when the Tories’ Euro-scepticism has been intensified, New  
Labour’s commitment to Europe and the single market has helped to make it more acceptable in 
British business circles. New Labour widely uses this chance. Blair said that, “there is another area
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Now, in the following section we will analyse this agenda to find 
answers to the questions o f whether it implies anjdhing that can be defended in the 
name of the left, and whether it can realise its promises.
4.5.2 The Meaning and the Feasibility of New Labour
Economics
First of all, with all its elements this is a one-nation project. It is 
one-nation since it does not see -rather it explicitly denies - any tension between 
the classes, or between the various segments o f society. Blair explains that his aim 
is “To build one nation socially, to work as one nation economically. To put aside 
the dogma and divisions o f the past” (Speech to the Annual Conference o f British 
Industry). If, as ironically stated by Cockett (1996), “Thatcher was the first Marxist 
prime minister of Britain, [since] she openly preached class warfare against the 
‘enemy within’ to return the country to a state safe for capital to fructify”, then 
Blair is the first liberal leader o f the Labour Party, who sees no tension between 
labour and capital, celebrates the end o f class with the birth o f new world order. In 
other words, he announces the end o f the war. Consider these words: “ [this is] not 
a matter o f ideology but o f national interest. The philosophy o f one Britain, one 
nation, in which we put behind us the old debates and focus on what we know 
needs to be done to make our country strong, is an economic as well as social
where Labour and business have common interest- Europe...British business has a real interest at 
stake in the debate on Europe...We need a govenunent putting positive ideas o f its own for the 
reform o f Europe” (Speech to the Annual Conference o f the Confederation o f  British Industry, 
1995).
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philosophy”. After a few words, he concludes: “Good for business Good for 
Britain”. (Speech to the Keidanren, Tokyo, 1996).
Against the overall background o f the previous section, one can ask 
two questions. The first one, to which we have a clear answer is: Does this agenda 
have anything to do with the left? Our answer to this is a resolute ‘no’. One should 
not pay much attention to the marketing rhetoric such as ethical socialism, 
stakeholder ism -both of which are already becoming much and much less used by 
Blair now- or the other notions such as the radical centre, centre left, or the Third 
Way: Renewal of Social Democracy, since, contrary to what they argue, they do not 
indicate an alternative path beyond left or right; rather they are only beyond left 
since in the final analysis they have nothing to do with the principal values or the 
political economy o f the left. The New Labour project offers nothing more beyond 
the conventional Anglo-Saxon model under a different rhetoric. More importantly, 
all these notions (of this rhetoric) refer to the attempt o f New Labour to redefine 
the substance of the centre with the essential terms o f the new-right, which 
inevitably implies the moving o f the centre of the British politics towards the right.
Putting it in terms of a more conventional discussion, at its crudest, 
the rightward shift o f Labour to the echelons o f the neo-classical economy occurs 
together with a shift in the perception of the individual and the place o f individual 
enterprise in the economic sphere. As is well known, the rational individual as the 
self-maximiser of its interest lies at the heart o f the neo-classical political economy. 
And this view does not see any tension- rather draws a positive correlation- 
between individual wealth and public welfare. Recall that the objection to such a
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conceptualisation of the individual has been one o f the fundamental tenets o f  
socialism o f any kind, parliamentary, Marxist, revisionist, ethical or Christian. 
Thus, Labour can be said to experience its deepest turn away from the left.
Furthermore, it must be noted here that the new-right which indeed 
heavily relied on the neo-classical economics, has differed from it by rejecting the 
possibility of reaching collective/public wealth by means of individual wealth 
creation. However, paradoxically. New Labour, on the one hand does not give up 
the economic priorities o f the new-right, i.e. the golden rule for the government, 
low taxation etc., on the other hand, it insists on the compatibility o f these priorities 
to an objective initially rejected by the new-right, i.e. opportunity and wealth for 
all, while this project itself has nothing to do with a sense o f left due to the reasons 
stated above. As a result, the New Labour project itself becomes nothing more than 
an oxymoron.
The second question is whether this project can succeed? Here one 
may think o f the success in two different contexts: First, in terms o f being a 
hegemonic project, second in terms of realising what it promised to do- A  
capitalism in which everybody is the winner.
Let us answer the second question first. Our answer is again ‘no’ 
since, let alone the socialist principles to which it has nothing to do, this project is 
barely able to realise some liberal (not neo-liberal) inspirations due to its economic 
conservatism and oxymoronic feature. In other words ‘the spectre’ is in charge and 
Thatcherism, whose principles are embraced in post-Thatcherism hardly permits 
the success o f New Labour. Having become committed to supply-side and macro -
107
economic stability, a government, in our view, can hardly be progressive. Perhaps 
the most significant fact is that Thatcherism had not promised a world in which 
everybody could win, or everybody would be given an opportunity; it promised to 
lower inflation, limit public spending, and to destroy unions. And Mrs. Thatcher 
knew the means o f doing this. However, now New Labour argues for the 
compatibility o f the modification version of the same means to a different goal. 
This is hardly convincing. Having commited to the regressive tax regime o f the 
Tories, together with fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, the best that New Labour can 
do (and does) is to steer the economy not worse than the Tories. Of course, there 
would be (and there are) nuances, but New Labour’s record, as expected, is far 
from being progressive.
Finally, can New Labour, or its project now named as the Third 
Way, be a hegemonic project? Our simple answer is that the success o f a 
hegemonic project depends on the success o f its programme. Therefore, since we 
do not believe that this programme can be successful, we also do not believe that 
New Labour can constitute a powerful hegemonic bloc. Once the public mood 
reverses, and the record o f the government starts to be seriously questioned, the 
success o f its hegemony is uncertain. One might argue that Labour’s election 
manifesto was already limited in terms of five specific pledges. This is true, but, no 
one should expect that a government would be publicly judged only in terms o f its 
five pledges since the ethos it sought to create -or it has created for the time being- 
will require much more than the realisation of five pledges.
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With this section we finished our investigation and analysis o f the 
political economy of New Labour. Now we will briefly examine another central 
element in the ideology o f New Labour: its social policy, or rather the 
transformation of its social policy into a conservative territory.
4.6 Social Conservatism of NevK Labour
If the Conservative Party had been a shelter for neo-liberalism in the 
last decades, it was actually the natural haven o f classical conservatism as its title 
implies. And indeed the marriage of British conservatism with neo-liberalism was 
been a difficult one since there is no such thing as society argument once 
articulated by Mrs Thatcher was a bit too much for the conservatives who for long 
years sought for an ordered society, obedient and religious people, and strong 
f a m i l i e s . O f  course the authoritarianism of Thatcherism and its emphasis on 
strong state were all welcomed, but it was not consistent with a conservative 
reflection on society.
Having accommodated to neo-classical economics, which were 
repackaged under a different rhetoric from that o f neo-liberalism, it would not have 
been imagined for New Labour not to seek a consensus with the views o f the 
traditional owners, more importantly the traditional voters o f the Conservative 
Party. Indeed the ground for such a consensus were already laid and it would be 
unfair to say that this was just an electoral strategy -of course it was an important 
part o f electoral strategy- since looking at the worldviews o f the creators o f the
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New Labour one can see that they have a different sense o f community, other than 
what the term used to mean in the Labour Party circles such as the occupational 
community. The basic elements o f this new understanding are strong family, law 
and order, toughness on crime, mutual responsibility, rights and obligations. 
Therefore, on the one hand. New Labour is honest in pushing forward these 
notions, but on the other hand, it is a fact that they are originally conservative 
notions which throughout its history had not found much place in the Labour Party.
It should be said that this agenda helped the popularisation o f New  
Labour. First, by appealing to the hearts of the conservative voters who were 
unsatisfied with Thatcherism, precisely with the socially destructive, fragmentary, 
and alienating consequences of Thatcherism.
Second, by appealing to the philosophy of conservative thinkers who 
were unhappy from the lack of a sense of community in Thatcherism, but for years 
stayed away from Labour since it Labour’s understanding of community and the 
other policies of the party was totally alien to their Weltschaimg. Now this gap 
could be bridged since New Labour was taking for granted the homo-economicus 
as well as without neglecting that homo-economicus is also a social entity that finds 
its place within the boundaries drawn on the basis o f a set o f moral values and 
duties. And the new world-view of (New) Labour which was headed by a faithful 
Anglican Tony Blair was a good offer. Famous conservative thinker John Gray was 
one o f the firsts who welcomed this offer and declared his support for New Labour. 
Let us now have a fast look at the elements of this offer.
20 One should recall that the roots o f British conservatism goes back to Edmund Burke and his
110
Citing from Downes and Morgan, Driver and Martell note that 
Labour’s stance on law and order was shaped by a number o f associations which 
can be called ‘hostages to fortune’. The most prominent of those were, first the 
historic link of the party to the trade unions; second. Labour’s commitment to 
underprivileged groups; third. Labour’s connection with political movements such 
as Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, or civil disobedience movements. It is 
obvious that all o f these under various conditions (for example strikes or 
demonstrations) would fall in conflict with law and order. Of course, the conflicts 
with law and order in these cases are indeed the sort o f conflicts with the 
conservative conceptualisation of law and order. Therefore, Labour, unlike 
conservatives, had not suggested law and order as its priority as a matter o f  
principle. Furthermore, again unlike conservatives who insist on the individuality 
of crime and refuse to link it to social and economic conditions, social democracy 
had insisted on the prominent role of social and economic deprivation, lack o f  
education, and inequality in the emergence of crime. Thus, the primary role o f 
social policy had to be eradicating the causes o f crime (Driver and Martell, 1998: 
114). Of course this is not to say that Old Labour supported o f burglars or 
murderers against victims, but it was just trying not to neglect the social causes o f  
crime and did stay away from developing a conceptualisation o f law and order 
which might be conservatively manipulated against any sort o f movement that 
seeks the enlargement o f social or individual rights and liberties. Because o f this it 
had been frequently accused by the Tories o f being soft on crime.
critique o f French Revolution.
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Contrary to Old Labour, the contemporary Labour Party makes the 
fight with crime and maintaining law and order as primary priorities o f home 
affairs, and forwards this under the slogan o f ‘zero tolerance’ (The Labour Party 
Election Manifesto, 1997). We have already stated that New Labour is strictly 
committed to the union legislation of the 1980 which is full o f restrictions. Here we 
will mention some other points.
Indeed the policy change had begun soon after Jack Straw returned 
from the USA, having been inspired by the ‘zero tolerance’ strategy o f mayor and 
police commissioner o f New York (Anderson and Mann, 1997: 256). Although his 
proposals, such as the introduction of blanket curfew powers on children and 
teenagers, were faced with hostility in the party and Straw lost his seat in the NEC; 
with the full backing o f Blair he kept his post first as Shadow secretary and then as 
minister in the government.
Throughout the election campaign, now Labour was accusing Tories 
of being soft on crime, while both sides were relentlessly producing tougher legal 
proposals, longer sentences, tougher policing and zero tolerance (The Election 
Manifesto 1997; Anderson and Mann, 1997: 260-62). After the election. Straw’s 
first move became the publication of Crime and Disorder Bill which abolishes the 
law stating that children aged between ten and fourteen are incapable o f telling 
right from wrong, introduces safety orders and curfew for the under tens linked to 
anti-social behaviour, and introduces anti-social behaviour orders for the over tens 
(Driver and Martell, 1998: 117). However, in order to see Starw’s last bright idea 
one had to wait until June 1999 when he proposed a new Freedom of Information
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Act in which public access to state documents was forbidden and the secrecy o f  
state documents were increased. The proposal was strictly protested and 
counteracted by a campaign as a result of which government agreed to rewrite the 
controversial clauses (The Guardian, 21/June/1999).
While Straw was competing with the Tories on crime and 
punishment, Blair was pushing forward family values through what some call a 
‘moral cmsade’. Single parents were one o f the targets o f this moralist agenda. 
After he showed his disapproval o f single parents on ITV’s Walden programme 
after arguing that children are best brought up ‘in a normal stable family’, Blair 
was harshly criticised and protested followed his statement. Here was a party 
leader, said a rioter, “contributing to the restriction o f a freedom to choose how to 
live and how to care for other human beings” (McSMith, 1996: 339; Anderson and 
Mann, 1997: 263). Another article written by Blair probably escaped from the 
caution: He wrote to the Sun, “We want a government hat recognises that women 
want to balance family and work, and helps them to do so (The Sun, 
31/March/1995; italic added).
Indeed this emphasis on family (as well as law and order) was 
synchronously tied to a new sense o f social morality. As these words reveal: “Both 
family and community rely on notions of mutual respect and duty. It is in the 
family that we first learn to negotiate the boundaries o f acceptable conduct and to 
recognise that we owe responsibility to others as well as ourselves (Speech to the 
Family Breakdown and Criminal Activity Conference, 1994). Indeed what Nev/
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Labour seeks to install is a new understanding of community.^’ We call it new 
since it is significantly different from what the notion o f community used to imply 
in Britain. " This changing conceptualisation o f community can be traced through 
four different lines. First, it has transformed from occupational/class to a one- 
nation meaning in which the individual, rather than any other aggregate o f 
people, is the main unit. Second, New Labour’s understanding of community does 
not refer to social rights and help by the paternalistic state for the poor but is 
widely formulated with ideas o f rights being conditional on responsibilities (Driver 
and Martell, 1998: 163). This means that in return for having an opportunity (such 
as education or employment), or rights, individuals have obligations towards it 
(take the job offered, or be obedient citizens to the proposals of Jack Straw). Third, 
this community is thought to be built and kept united on the basis o f moral values, 
rather than a universal provision of a minimum socio-economic condition to all 
members. Therefore, this is a moral communitarianism instead of an socio­
economic one. Fourth, these values -  such as valuing ‘normal’ families at the 
expense o f single parents- themselves are originally conservative and morally 
prescriptive. Anderson and Marm note that the most distinctive feature o f such a 
communitarianism is its intrusiveness into spheres like the family which are 
referred to as private by liberal politics (Amderson and Mann, 1997: 246).
Finally, with few exaggeration, one can argue that New Labour 
managed to reconcile the partners o f a difficult marriage, conservatism and neo-
In a discussion via Internet, a participant ironically stated that: ‘Blair seems to value something 
called 'the community', defined as 'ordinary hardworking families who play by the mles'.
On the other hand, it is not so new since it has its origins in American communitarianism.
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liberalism under a new roof other than the Tory party. Or, looking at from a 
different angle, the new right’s objection between collectivism and individual 
‘freedom’ has become displaced by a new formulation between the two, but with 
the collectivity described as a community o f individuals whose economic life is 
individualised. The ideology o f New Labour, having heavily relied on the 
economic individualism, seeks to offset the consequences o f such an individualism 
in social illiberalism. Perhaps, as Driver and Martell observed, “In a way no longer 
thought possible for the economy. New Labour in government looks set to be 
intei-ventionist in social matters...Whatever the problem...New Labour seems 
poised to reach for the legal pen ” (Driver and Martell, 1998: 119). The most 
absurd thing is that some New Labourers are tend to interpret this 
communitarianism as the socialist dimension o f New Labour’s ideology. For 
example, Anthony Wright, a leading moderniser and MP, does not hesitate to call 
this ideology as liberal socialism. He says that “ [liberal socialism] qualifies 
socialism as a doctrine of community and responsibility, with a liberal reminder 
of...the importance o f individuals pursuing their own purposes in their own way. 
In it fusion- o f state and market, public and private, common purpose and 
individual purpose- it opens up a whole policy agenda” (Wright, 1996: 140). 
Nothing would distort the idea of socialism better than this prescription. Perhaps 
this was what Tony Blair intended to say when he contemptuously expressed his 
idea o f socialism as social-ism.
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4.7 From Welfare to Nowhere
As was stated in the second chapter, the welfare state was one o f the 
most important grounds of the post-war settlement and it was the greatest 
achievement o f Labour in the mid 1940s. The primary goal was quite clear: To 
reduce poverty and narrow the inequality gap between people on the basis of need 
rather than merit. However, to Labour intellectuals, it was more than just a 
practical set o f policies in order to deal with poverty. The provision o f welfare on a 
universal basis was first a mechanism o f delivering the socialist goals o f equality 
and social justice; second it was seen as the mark of the citizenship, as developed 
by Marshall (1950) in the modem society. In this context, welfare state and 
equality were not just means but also significant ends in themselves. In the party, 
this was rooted so powerfully that neither revisionist intellectuals, who mostly 
challenged the idea o f public ownership, did think to revise it, nor revisionist 
Labour governments, like that of Wilson, did question the necessity welfare state. 
Even the Tories until Thatcher did not dare to touch the welfare state.
4.7.1 What Happened To the British Welfare State
The assault started in 1979 by Thatcher. According to the new right, 
many o f Britain’s problems, such as economic underperformance and social 
indiscipline, could be attributed to the growth o f the welfare state. It was displacing 
the essential disciplines and incentives o f the market place, undermining the 
incentive to work (Castles and Pierson, 1996: 235). Nevertheless, the basic reason
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was that welfare provisions were very costly for state, and an important source o f  
deficit in the budget.
Conservative governments introduced tougher rules on eligibility for 
benefits, increased spending on benefit fraud investigators and implemented huge 
cuts on benefit and pension rates, the level o f child benefit was frozen, earning 
related unemployment and sickness benefits were abolished, and the values o f 
many benefits were reduced while some were taxed (Anderson and Mann, 1997; 
211). After 1983, social security was reconsidered: supplementary benefit was 
renamed and reduced in value, housing benefits were eut, death and maternity 
grants were abolished, the system of one-off pajments to needy claimants was 
replaced with a system of loans. Most dramatically, the government scaled down 
entitlements to SERPS and provided tax cuts for people who opt out o f it into 
private schemes, and after 1987, child benefits were frozen and entitlement to 
income support was tied to tougher ‘availability for work’ rules (Anderson and 
Mann, 1997: 212). The outcome was expected: a massive increase in poverty and 
reliance on the means-tested ‘safety net’ while the better-off were able to pay for 
private security provision and pension. According to the latest figures, the poorest 
tenth o f the British population is worse off in absolute terms than it was before 
Tory government, and nearly a quarter o f British people live on less than average 
income. One in six people now claims means-tested income support, compared to 
one in twelve in 1979 (Anderson and Mann, 1997: 212). According to the UN' 
Development Reports, under Tory years, inequality has increased faster in Britain 
than any other western country except for Australia (UNDP Human Deevelopment
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Report cited in Independent, 21 July, 1996) where a so called Labor Party which 
had experienced an ideological modernisation towards the right before British 
Labour, and was led by Paul Keating who was very admired by Blair, was in power 
(For a useful analysis on the effect of Australian Labor Party on British Labour, 
see; Beyond Labourism and Socialism:. How the Australian Labor Party Developed 
the model of ‘New Labour’, written by Boris Frankel, New Left Review , No.221)
Until 1987, Labour had been responding to these policies by 
promising to reverse them and to bring the universal welfare provision back. Since 
1987, as we showed, the party watered down most of its daily policies while the 
principal ambitions on the vitality of welfare state remained. However, since the 
early 1990s, a new perception of welfare had been maturated. At the core o f this 
new perception, as we stated in the third chapter, was the idea that ‘people should 
be (equally) given to opportunity’ but the equality of outcome through 
redistribution, was no more at stake.
New Labour took this perception as its basis and tied it to its 
economics. Let us explain how.
4.7.2 Displaced Case of the Labour Party
First o f all, unlike classical social democracy or some branches o f 
liberalism. New Labour does not take poverty/inequality (now in its popular jargon 
it is called excluded) as something to be dealt with as a matter o f class interest or 
moral requirement since they are evils for human beings. Rather, New Labour
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takes it in terms o f cost and benefits calculated in the context o f global 
competitiveness. For example, Blair says,
The existence o f what is sometimes called underclass -  a group 
excluded from society’s mainstream- is an enormous drain on public 
spending -  directly in welfare; indirectly in crime and 
environmental decay. It destroys the sense o f common purpose and 
effort essential to sustain a country as a working society and 
economy... This is why we have launched new proposals to help a 
forgotten generation (Speech to the Armual Conference o f the 
Confederation o f British Industry, 1995).
Of course, these words explicitly illustrate an objection to the 
conservative idea that some degree of poverty and inequality are essential to force 
individual upward mobilisation. However, when thought carefully, they also reveal 
the depth o f the ideological transformation that the Labour Party experienced. 
Placing the fight against poverty (which is the most explicit exposé o f inequality) 
as a case, or as an ultimate goal tied to a set of moral and political values is one 
thing. And placing equality as an impediment to national growth or global 
competitiveness is quite another since at least in the purely theoretical terrain, this 
implies a conception o f the world developed on grounds which are totally far 
from anything humanitarian i.e. acceptability o f poverty if  it had not been risking 
competitiveness. This, in microcosm, notes Ellison, is social Schumpeterianism at 
work in which the traditional welfare element -  the top-down attempt to confer
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equality for its own sake- is underplayed while ‘quality’ and ‘relevance’ are 
promoted in the name of social and economic efficiency (Ellison, 1997: 55). One 
might say that an economy can not be governed on purely moral grounds but, 
according to us, such a separation of ethics from politics is quite unacceptable and 
it might prove detrimental due to its long term social consequences
Expectedly, Blair’s spin doctors do not fall behind their master in 
calculating the costs to economy:
When families breakdown and inadequate parents simply cannot 
cope with problem children, or are not fit to cope with them because 
of violence and sexual abuse, it costs a local authority £40,000 year 
to purchase a place in a private or voluntary home- three times the 
fees of the best public schools in Britain. It is a massively high-cost 
policy, with a small chance of successful pay-off (Mendelson and 
Liddle, 1996: 129).
In this context, our critique to new Labour, it must be said, is on a 
much fundamental ground. It is not just a matter o f unions’ link with the party, or 
how much nationalisation/privatisation would be enough or too much, since New 
Labour's principal problem lies in its new understanding of what a just and good 
system is. Perhaps Bewes’ diagnosis was quite right when he wrote: “The abysses 
at the heart o f the New Labour is precisely a metaphysical absence, which is filled 
by nothing more profound than the global logic of capital” (Bewes, 1998: 208). 
The words o f Grayson illustrates how New Labour is far from even a liberal 
philosophy: “ [New Labour] seems to have no sense that people should have social 
rights as well as political ones. It does not seem to realise that inequalities.. .and the
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effect o f living in poverty severely limit the life chances, and therefore the liberty 
o f individuals” (Grayson, 1998; 38).
4.7.3 Welfare Policy of New Labour
New Labour has taken for granted the new right view that welfare 
state is an important drain on the budget and make it impossible to follow the 
‘golden rule’ on limited public spending and low inflation. In other words, welfare 
provisions are unaffordable and there can be no return to the pre-Thatcher levels of 
welfare expenditure. In the Queen’s Speech (1997), he stated that Britain has 
reached the limits of the public’s willingness simply to fund an unreformed welfare 
system through ever high taxes and spending. If there would be no more taxation, 
it is hardly possible to create new sources to pay for the welfare. New Labour seeks 
to overcome this matter first by ‘welfare to work’, second, what is called ‘internal 
restructuring’.
The idea behind welfare reform, which was initially pushed forward 
by the Commisison for Social Justice, is to transform it from a ‘safety net in times 
of trouble to a springboard for economic opportunity’. New Labour argues that 
welfare to work would be a hand-up to people, instead o f hand-out. This means 
that, in an era when distributionary economics is over, people would be given the 
opportunity to be educated/trained, and develop themselves, so at the end they will, 
through their own work, not depend on welfare benefits. Theoretically welfare to 
work is a good idea (no defender o f the welfare state would principally object it)
121
but it is barely feasible due to three basic reasons which are not exogenous to New  
Labour economics. The first is about the workability o f the idea. Driver and Martell 
remind that welfare to work schemes face displacement and dead-weight problems: 
some of those who found work will displace existing workers, and some would 
have found jobs anyway, so the number of jobs created each month becomes 
relatively modest (Driver and Martell, 1998: 110).
Secondly, it is clear that welfare to work is a supply-side policy in 
general , and it is about increasing the quality and quantity o f labour in particular. 
However, this does not tell anything about the vital question on the demand side: 
What if  there are no jobs? It is not a secret that welfare to work policy has its 
contemporary origins among the Democratic Party exercise in the USA. However, 
warns Driver and Martell, one important aspect o f the American economy becomes 
seriously overlooked: its attention to demand side o f the economy (Driver and 
Martell, 1998: 112). Leaving the question whether the supply-side reforms worked 
well or not, the Federal Reserve, unlike the Bank o f England which made inflation 
its sole target, allows the US economy to grow at higher rates than Britain, while 
low inflation did not absolutely prevailed over the high employment. By contrast, 
as we mentioned in the previous pages, the Bank o f England still talks about the 
natural rate of unemployment. Robert Reich, one of the great defenders o f supply- 
side reforms in the USA, wrote in The Guardian that “fiscal and monetary policies 
have to be adjusted to maintain adequate demand near to full employment” (The 
Guardian, 14/July/1997). Larry Elliot writes that “job subsidies and bringing 
[people] back into the workplace will merely have the effect o f driving down real
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wages unless the supply o f jobs is expanded”. (The Guardian, 9/June/1997). In fact, 
thinking a bit sceptically and regarding what we referred to as the ‘displacement o f  
the case o f Labour’, there is enough ground to share the argument o f Marqusee 
who says that welfare to work, in the context o f New Labour, was originally 
developed in order to compel workers into the labour market advantageous to 
employers as well as to reduce state spending (Marqusee, 1997: 127).
The third point is simply about the cash: where from will the money 
be found, and if there would be no new source how will this scheme (of welfare to 
work and supply-side reforms) run? Those remain unanswered, and the present 
record o f the government is still far from being successful in solving it. As 
Hutton once observed while investment in skills and the infrastructure is arguably a 
‘good thing’, to argue solely in these terms leaves the ground to conservative 
economics, and undermines the social democratic and liberal case. Thus, only if  a 
government is prepared to tax to pay for them, it can equip the unskilled with skills 
or boost spending on education (The Guardian, l/April/1996) Therefore, the budget 
and tax limits o f New Labour makes it quite difficult to deal with welfare to work.
What is called ‘internal restmcturing’ is thought to overcome these 
problems. It actually refers to making (marginal) modifications in welfare agencies 
instead o f chaimelling extra resources to them, or bringing tough supervisions to 
ensure that they work more efficiently. We call them marginal because they do not 
mean a reversal of marketisation of welfare implemented under the Tories. Blair 
once said: “If the Tories say there is no money to fund better public services, then
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let us tell them the cuts they could make” (The Speech to the Labour Party 
Conference, 1994). Education and health are the best examples of this.
On the National Health System, Labour is obsessed to cut cost by 
removing the bureaucratic processes o f the internal market. The money saved ■was 
said to be around £100 million. However, Driver and Martell notes, compared to 
the fact that more than £30 billion is spent on health per year, or that the NHS’ 
debt in April 1997 was £200 million, £100 million means almost nothing. 
Notwithstanding with this. New Labour is adherent to the purchased-provider split 
in the internal market, another Tory legacy. The only reversal plan is to swing the 
assets of the trusts to the NHS, while the management o f trusts remain in the hands 
of the trust’s managers (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 256; Driver and Martell, 1998: 
94).
Education is said to be one of the priorities of New Labour. It is a 
vital supply-side area, and constitute the basis o f welfare to work. Although, a 
certain amount of money, supplied by one-time windfall tax which was taken from; 
privatised utilities, was injected to the program for cutting class s i z e s . N e w  
Labour seeks to improve education at little or no more cost,^ "* for instance by 
placing inspection on schools, removing ‘failing’ teachers, or asking teacher to be 
more hard-working, or closing ‘failing’ schools^^ (McSmith, 1996: 340). Parents
New Labour also plans to provide extra money to this project by abolishing the Assisted Places 
Scheme which enables a number o f poor children to attend private schools, and has a £120 million 
budget.
Blair once made his motto the words o f the Permanent Secretary at the Department o f Education, 
who argued that ‘there was room for a 30 per cent improvement in the education system within 
existing budgets”.
It is worth-caution that in the case o f failure or inefficiency, New Labour dares to remove 
teachers or close schools, but when it comes to private sector, it is quite silent.
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are also asked to be more responsible in the education o f their children. For 
example, they should check to see that whether their children did their homework 
or not (The Spectature Lecture, 1995; Mendelson and Liddle, 1996: 92) No 
reasonable parent denies the importance of doing homework but, indeed this 
example explicitly shows New Labour’s acceptance of government’s incapability 
on affairs that need public initiative. In another speech on education, Blair did not 
hesitate to state that, though social conditions can of course affect a school’s 
performance, it is wrong to say that because a school exists in a poor or deprived 
neighbourhood, it can not succeed (Speech at Didcot Girls School, 1996; italic 
added). At the core o f such speeches, for us, lies an attempt to overshadow the 
decisive importance o f socio-economic conditions in education or any relevant 
area. In other words. New Labour says that “we supply ethos, but do not expect 
much money’’.
As a matter which was once fundamental to the party, New Labour 
dropped its earlier promise to bring back the comprehensive principle in secondary 
schooling by the reinstalling local authority over schools that had opted out o f it 
under the Tories (Leys and Panitch, 1997: 255). Ironically, the Blair family had 
decided to send their oldest son to the London Oratory, Roman Catholic school, 
which was one o f the firsts that opted-out to become grant maintained. Then, 
having faced animosity from within the party, the Blairs gave up. This matter was 
important for the party since, in 1993, partially as an attempt to privatise education, 
and partially to curb the local power of the Labour Party which usually enjo3^ s 
more authority in local government, every comprehensive school were compelled
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by legislation to decide whether to apply for grant maintained status. Then, more 
than 99 per cent o f (23,475) schools decided not even to hold a ballot. In 99 
schools out of 210 the majority voted against a change in the status o f school. In 
almost every ballot, notes McSmith, Labour Party members helped to organise ‘no’ 
campaign, and thousands o f party members argued against holding a ballot at all 
(McSmith, 1996; 342).
In November 1997, New Labour government published the 
Teaching and Higher Education Bill which ended free tuition in university 
education (Time, 12/October/1998). The argument was that university students 
who would expect a life-long above-average income, should contribute to their 
higher education. The Bill abolished the student grant which would include the full 
costs of the university students’ maintenance, too. In July and December 1997, 
with the white papers Excellence in Schools, and School Standards Bill 
respectively, the government introduced new inspections on the Local Education 
Authorities, (LEA) and strengthened the (central) power o f Department o f  
Education over LEAs (Driver and Martell, 1998: 101).
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CHAPTER V
THE THIRD WAY
5.1 What is The Third Way
Historically the term itself has a far-reaching past preceding the 
contemporary debate. As can be expected, it implies a political trajectory different 
from that o f the left and right. In the course of the twentieth century, this is not the 
first such kind of attempt to identify an alternative trajectory. For example, in the 
1920s and 1930s, it was popular among national socialist and fascist movements as 
a way of asserting their position within the ideologies of the West. In British 
politics, we can consider social liberals or the Fabians o f the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century, both of whom, within the wildest years o f laissez-faire 
capitalism, offered a middle way or human-face capitalism with a sense o f public 
interest. Some, moreover, interpret the post-war settlement of Western Europe, the 
consensus politics on the welfare state and mixed economy, as a sort o f third way. 
In the mid 1970s, the term was also coined by those who sought to formulate a 
market socialism, which ceased to be a popular debate now.
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Returning to the Third Way, in this chapter we address, first o f all 
the issue that as an ideological position it is still not one that has found complete 
approval and usage both in public and the Labour Party circles. Rather, it 
sometimes leads to disagreement while some o f the members o f Labour who 
actively took place even in the formation o f New Labour demonstrate their 
disapproval as it has become more realised that the Third way (as articulated by 
Blair and Clinton, and as theorised by a stuff around them) seeks to sweep all 
values o f social democracy for the sake of installing its own hegemony. For 
instance, in the spring o f 1998, two prominent Labour modernisers, Simon Buckby 
and Neal Lawson, in a jointly written article titled Third Way? No Way Tony, asked 
the government to revive the values of social democracy rather than flirt with the 
ideas beyond the left and right (New Statesman, 13/March/1998). Nevertheless, the 
term, for the time being, is strongly pushed forward by the leadership o f the party 
together with the support of some think-tank intellectuals and few academics.' 
Although all other leaders of European left-wing parties are not enthusiastic to 
employ it, Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, and also Gerard Schroder are passionately 
committed to describe such a kind of novel political route. Their co-operation is 
not unknown.
' Prominent figures o f the Third Way debate are: Anthony Giddens, David Halpem, Mark Leonard, 
David Miliband, and Geoff Mülgan. Will Hutton, whose ideas once influenced Blair also can be 
counted but for the time-being he distances himself from th e  T h ird  fVayers. Tony Blair himself, in 
1998, published a Fabian Pamphlet, titled The T h ird  W ay: N e w  P o lit ic s  f o r  th e  N e w  C en tu ry . 
Meanwhile, Jack Straw, Gordon Brown, and Robin Cook, the Labour Party MPs and ministers, got 
involved in the public debate through interviews and writings.
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Lloyd and Bilefsky note that developing such a term is urgent for 
them since it would give a narrative to these administrators: To Clinton for what he 
has done, to Blair (and Schroder) for what they claim to do (New Statesman, 27/ 
March/1998). In any case their governments need an ideology, a framework o f 
ideas to bind their themes and to assert their distinctiveness. Putting it in terms of 
hegemony, for example Blair has to do what Thatcher achieved: to make his ideas 
shape the minds o f millions. Blair desperately needs it also to counterbalance the 
attack on New Labour from liberal and left circles, to convince them that New 
Labour is not a warmed-over version o f Thatcherism.
One should also recall that, if  it can become an ideology or a 
hegemonic project, the Third Way will have followed the same trajectory 
Thatcherism had followed. Beginning without a coherent ideology, but with a more 
or less certain attitude on economics, these ideologies are motivated by a 
determination to be different from their predecessors, looking across the Atlantic 
for inspiration and across the Channel for sisters (Wallace, 1998: 15-16).
The New Labour Project has not started as a Third Way project; it 
started as a project o f modernisation (of the Party and proposal for the country 
whose detailed investigation was made in the previous chapter). Indeed, New  
Labour leadership, since 1994, has been seeking to offer a number o f different 
brands for their project. Once it was ethical socialism, next it turned to be 
stakeholder capitalism, then the third way was in fashion. Nowadays, according to 
the recent news, Blair is claiming to be the political heir to Gladstone, the liberal 
politician of the nineteenth century. However, the essence what was given under
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different titles does not change much; Overcoming both social democracy and neo­
liberalism (or socialism and liberalism) and reaching a new synthesis beyond them. 
And the program o f this so-called synthesis is essentially what we saw in New 
Labour. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in equalising New Labour with the Third 
Way. This is to say, o f course, the latter is exposed to all criticisms we made about 
the former. However, in this chapter, our purpose is to leave the daily policy details 
aside and briefly introduce some underpinnings of the Third Way project on the 
basis o f the writings o f Tony Blair and his guru, Anthony Giddens.
At the very heart o f the Third Way agenda lie two basic 
assumptions. First, the allegedly failure of social democracy to deal with the 
changing economic and political conditions, primarily globalisation and its 
implications, and its inadequacy to deliver economic stability. Second, the failure 
of neo-liberalism to provide equal opportunity to people, and deal with the social 
and moral problems in which the free market plays a decisive role.
Indeed it would be better to recall Hutton since he has for several 
years been arguing that “The difficulty is not [Britain’s] attachment to capitalism. 
The problem is more complex, rooted in the highly unproductive way in which 
British social, economic, and governmental structures lock together. The solution is 
neither to pursue the current path, nor to attempt any return to the failed 
corporatism o f the 1970s. Rather it is to strike out in a new direction altogether, 
escaping polarities of collectivism and individualism... to wards a new conception 
o f the stakeholder economy and society" (Hutton, 1997). Echoing the Polanyian 
themes, he argued that other countries manage their ‘moral economy’ better than
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Britain does, their markets are embedded in a network o f social and political 
institutions giving them values and priorities in their own conditions. The problem 
for Britain, he says, is economic short-termism and selfishness and the solution 
should be a total solution: “A written constitution, the démocratisation o f civil 
society, the republicanisation o f finance, the recognition that the market economy 
has to be managed and regulated both at home and abroad, the upholding o f  
welfare state that incorporates social citizenship” (Hutton, 1995; 326).
Some interpreted this prospect as a kind o f socialism meeting a kind 
of capitalism (Wright, 1996: 140). This was not a correct diagnosis but meanwhile, 
for many who consider themselves on the left, especially for those on the social 
democratic terrain, Hutton’s ideas were to a large extent agreeable ones. What he 
offered was able to both challenge neo-liberalism, and help to develop a social 
democratic strategy. Tony Blair too found some useful elements for his project in 
what Hutton suggested.
The term stakeholder, which was borrowed from Hutton, was 
frequently employed among the New Labour circles. Stakeholderism or 
stakeholder capitalism, for Hutton, meant a society in which firms have 
obligations, codified in law, not just to their stakeholders but also to some 
combination of their suppliers, bankers, consumers and workers, as well as 
responsibilities to the environment and to local communities (Hutton 1995; 
Anderson and Mann, 1997: 39). However, for Blair and Gordon Brown, this 
‘German social market model’ was something to be carefully avoided with its high 
social costs, high wages, strong unions and employment protection which
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precludes the competitiveness of laissez-faire economics in a global economy. For 
New Labour, stakeholderism meant a system in which companies go about their 
business as usual but in which every citizen will have the chance o f having a stake. 
(Anderson and Mann, 1997: 40). One can substitute stake with opportunity in order 
to understand what it simply implies for New Labour. However probably due to the 
popularisation of the term (in Hutton’s context) among the conventional social 
democrat i.e. Old Labour circles. New Labour ceased to enjoy the term and 
immediately jumped to the Third Way.^
5.2 Lost in The Third Way
As stated above, the Third Way heavily relies on the assumption o f  
the failures o f social democracy and neo-liberalism. According to Anthony 
Giddens, it can provide a framework for political and economic thought that cuts 
across the old divides o f social democracy and neo-liberalism (Giddens, 1998a: 
18). For Giddens, the overall aim of the Third Way politics should be to help 
citizens pilot their way through the major revolutions o f our time: globalisation, 
transformations in personal life, and our relationship to nature (Giddens, 1998b: 
64). For Blair, the Third Way stands for a modernised social democracy, 
passionate in its commitment to social justice and goals o f the centre-left, but
' However the popularisation o f stakeholder among social democrat circles should not lead the 
reader to think that it is really a challenging idea that can de defended in the name o f the left. 
Maltby and Wilkinson (1998) point out that although s ta k e h o ld in g  can be interpreted as a challenge 
to the Thatcherite claim that there is no such a thing as society, it is a concept which owes its appeal 
to its imprecision, and is unworkable in practice and that its deployment, rather than imposing 
accountability on capitalism, merely represents an attempt to make free market capitalism look 
more acceptable. In this respect, the claims that it will make companies both efficient and socially
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flexible, innovative and forward-looking in the means to achieve it (Blair, 1998; 1). 
Blair also argues that the Third Way marks a third way within the left since, to him, 
the debate within the left had been dominated by two unsatisfactory positions 
between the fundamentalist and revisionist wings (Blair, 1998: 1-2).
In his New Statesman article which can be seen as a draft version, o f  
his later book , The Third Way, Giddens introduces some the basic aspects of the 
Third Way as such:
Social Democracy Neo-liberalism Third Way
Class politics of the left Class politics o f the right Modernising movement o f  
the centre
Old mixed economy Market fundamentalism New mixed economy
Corporatism Minimal state New democratic state
Internationalism Conservative nation Cosmopolitan nation
Strong Welfare state, 
protecting ‘from cradle to 
grave’
Welfare safety net Social investment state
Giddens says that with the rapid shrinking o f the working class and 
the disappearance o f the bipolar world, the salience o f class politics has declined 
and scientific and technological change cut across the left-right divide or recast it 
(Giddens, 1998a: 18). Therefore, he argues, appealing to a wide constituency the 
Third Way represents a new modernising movement o f the centre. Although it 
accepts the socialist value o f social justice, he says, the Third Way rejects the class 
politics o f the left (Giddens, 1998a; 19-20).
responsible are empty of content. This is a matter worth-investigating but within the limits o f this
133
On economy, what Giddens calls the new mixed economy, in 
contrast to old notion of a mixed economy, does not refer to a distinction between 
public and private initiative, but it implies a balance between regulation and 
deregulation; and between the economic and the non-economic in society 
(Giddens, 1998b: 100; Giddens, 1998a: 19). However, the goal of regulation in 
Giddens’s context, as different from what the term conventionally implies, is 
basically the province o f government to enable markets run effectively, and to 
preserve competition. Thus, it can be interpreted as the equivalent o f Blair’s public- 
private partnership. Then, Giddens, as if  asserting a radical agenda, adds that new 
mixed economies should develop alternative methods o f regulation through a blend 
of incentives and controls to ensure that the Third Way notion of ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ becomes the value o f business. Perhaps this is a perfect 
illustration o f what journalist Ian Mcwhirter meant when he wrote about New  
Labour:
A decade and a half of free-market Thatcherism has reproduced 
levels of social inequality unseen since Victorian times, and the 
social fabric is being destroyed by mass unemployment. New 
Labour has no particular remedy other than to ask businesspeople 
to be more responsible (The Observer, 19/November/1995).
On the state, the Third Wayers argue that instead o f being keen on 
expanding or shrinking the scope of the state and government what is necessary is
study we will not further the discussion.
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reconstruct them (Giddens, 1998a; 20). Only this, Giddens says, can go beyond the 
‘government is the problem’ or ‘government is the answer’ approaches. Although 
this gives the impression that Giddens is searching for a balance between public 
interest and private enterprenaurship, what he means by reconstruction is 
absolutely political; the reorganisation and démocratisation of British state. For the 
stability o f what he calls the new democratic state, Giddens uses devolution and the 
non-orthodox forms o f participation like referenda as the keys. Surely these are 
very important points but, first, it is very deficient to limit the agenda with the 
political reconstmction while socio-economic dimension is widely ignored, second, 
this proposal contains no undertaking, for instance, to reverse the Thatcherite 
transfer o f authority from the central civil service to quangos. Further when one 
consider the attitude o f New Labour government to the reconstniction/ 
démocratisation, except for devolution there seems no intention for local 
government empowerment, nor is there a sign for the démocratisation of the state.
On civil society, Giddens has an interesting proposal. He says that 
the government should play a basic part in the regeneration o f civil society 
(Giddens, 1998a; 20; Giddens, 1998b; 73). Such an idea, the construction o f civil 
society by means of the state, appears in great contradiction with liberal democratic 
(let alone the Marxist critique o f civil society) discourse of civil society.
Furthermore, discussing civil society within the Third Way 
framework, Giddens does not hesitate to reduce the notion to neighbourliness, good 
friendship and family relations (Giddens, 1998b; 85). Indeed this is a good example 
of what some complains about the Third Way, depoliticisation o f politics. In the
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absence o f a real alternative agenda, the Third Way politics, inevitably, becomes 
reduced to such proposals. Meanwhile, Giddens would not even use the notion o f 
civil society because New Labour’s popular term is a community which consists o f 
individuals who are expected to be relentless entrepreneurs at work, obedient 
citizens before the state, couples in a ‘normal’ marriage, and good believers on 
Sundays.
5.2.1 Welfare: The Nightmare of The Third Way
As for welfare, the scapegoat of the new right, both Blair and 
Giddens begin by stating that some of the criticism made by the new-right are valid 
(Giddens 1998a; 20). Giddens adds that the welfare state is essentially 
undemocratic, its motivating force is protection and care, but it does not give 
enough space for personal liberty (Giddens, 1998b: 112). The problem is that 
Giddens proposes this critique as if it was the core o f the criticism o f the new-right. 
He does not bother to recall that the main criticism of the new right with regard to 
welfare was due to its concern with budget austerity and rolling back the state. If 
the new right has a criticism regarding the lack of liberty in the welfare state, it was 
based on the conceptualisation of liberty, like the ‘choice’, within the framework of 
what can be called ‘profit ethics’. Therefore, persistently underestimating these 
points, Giddens overshadows the fact that if there was a real inquiry o f welfare 
state in terms o f liberty as we understand in the political philosophy, it comes from 
the left rather than the right. Giddens travels light to give away the notions o f the 
left to the hands of the right. Then, comes his offer.
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First o f all, call it either the Third Way, or the New Labour, there is 
a very basic point in their understanding of economics and the welfare. There is no 
more redistribution. The only distribution, Giddens says, can be the distribution o f 
the possibilities (Giddens, 1998b; 101). In Blair’s words: “I fully recognise that the 
private sector, not government, is at the forefront of wealth creation and 
employment generation. Yet government has a vital role in promoting competitive 
markets, encouraging long-term research and investment, and helping to equip 
citizens with the skills and aspirations they need in the modem economy” (Blair, 
1998: 10).
What Giddens offers in this sense is something he calls social 
investment state whose main guideline is that wherever possible investment in 
human-capital, rather than direct payment of benefits, will establish a new relation 
between risk and security on the one hand, and individual and collective 
responsibility on the other. For him, social democrats have to shift the relationship 
between risk and security involved in the welfare state, in order to develop a 
society o f responsible risk takers in the spheres of the government, business 
enterprise and labour markets (Giddens, 1998b: 100).
In order to reach this sort of welfare understanding, expectedly, 
Giddens first o f all has to discuss the notion o f equality and needs to redefine it. He 
chooses to define equality as inclusion and inequality as exclusion^ (Giddens, 102). 
The former refers to citizenship, civil and political rights and obligations that all 
members of a society should have, not just formally but as a reality of their lives. It
’ Please note that Blair prefers to use the term e x c lu d e d  instead of the p o o r .
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also means opportunities (the buzzword!) and involvement in public space 
(Giddens, 1998b: 102-103). On exclusion, Giddens marks two forms of it. The first 
is the exclusion of those at the bottom, cut off from opportunities of society. The 
second is the exclusion o f those at the top, withdrawal of affluent elite from the 
public life (Giddens, 1998b: 104). The second point might hold the truth but what 
it has to do with equality in the discussion of the welfare state in terms of social 
democracy is not clear.
When discussing the first form o f exclusion, Giddens is unstoppable. 
He without reservation subscribes to the view that “the gap between the rich and 
poor will keep growing and no one can stop it” (Giddens, 1998b: 106). Blair would 
not dare to be so explicit, not because he has a different idea but because he wants 
to be re-elected. The very problem with this view is that it is so unwilling to see 
that inequality has significantly increased, not accidentally but by deliberate 
policies, under the Tories. Therefore, it can also be something that can be 
decreased if  a government has enough detemiination and will.
Giddens gives an interesting example in order to delegitimise the 
emphasis on equality. He says: “ A basic influence upon the distribution o f income 
is growing sexual equality. Here income inequality is decreasing, contradictory to 
the simple statement that society is becoming more unequal” (Giddens, 1998b: 107; 
italic added). Indeed this is a typical the Third Wayer exercise: In order to justify 
their ideas and to assert their so-called difference both Blair and Giddens do not 
hesitate to play with terms or moves the points o f the debates to irrelevant contexts.
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For example, Blair, in his pamphlet, goes to assert that there is not 
much difference between liberalism and democratic socialism. The former stands 
for the ‘primacy o f individual liberty in the market economy’ while the latter aims 
at ‘social justice with the state as its main agent’. He finds ‘no necessary conflict 
between the two’ (Blair, 1998: 1). Within this pseudo rhetoric, as one commentator 
rightly observed, he winds up more than 200 years o f political debate (New 
Statesman, 25/September/1998). Of course the intention behind this argument is 
simple: To justify the attempt to synthesise the left and the right in the name o f the 
Third Way.
Similarly, Gordon Brown, the Chancellor, in a book assertively 
titled Reinventing The Left, does not hesitate to write that “socialism has always 
been much more ambitious in its aspirations than the removal o f poverty, 
unemployment and squalor...” (Brown, 1994: 113) while he does not bother to 
clarify either what these aspirations are. However, more importantly. Brown 
obscures the fact that realisation of the socialist aspirations -which according to us 
finds its ultimate expression in the phrase ‘from each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs’- primarily require the removal of what Brown seeks 
not to deal with.
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5,2.2 Globalisation; More Royalist Than the King
Globalisation, as we showed in the previous chapter, plays a 
decisive role in determining the Third Way policies. The starting point is the 
acceptance o f globalisation as a fact, with all its consequences for the economy 
within a highly competitive and deregulated market and the type o f jobs it makes 
available (Mayer, 1999: 298).
Indeed, Giddens deals with this issue for a long time and his analysis 
of globalisation is sometimes more explanatory than some other explanations. He 
rejects speaking globalisation as if it is the force o f the nature. He also does not 
underestimate the fact that states, business corporations and other groups have 
actively played significant roles in the formation o f it. He perceives the term not 
only in terms of economy but also recognises the multi-dimensionality o f it. 
However, when it comes the policies of the Third Way towards globalisation, most 
of those are significantly forgotten. He is content with saying that “the third way 
politics should take a positive role towards globalisation in its broadest meaning” 
(Giddens, 1998b: 64).
Thomas Mayer notes that the undifferentiated use o f the 
globalisation argument is to a high degree ideological, mainly designated to 
delegitimise labour demands, macro-economics and the claim o f all political 
responsibility for the outcome o f the economy, rather than depicting the new reality 
accurately (Mayer, 1999: 298). However, Giddens does not hesitate to limit the 
room o f criticism of globalisation by identifying this territory as that o f the far-right 
(Giddens, 1998b:44). He sees no reason other than being a nationalist to argue
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against globalisation. Indeed Giddens acts tricky here since indeed the objection o f  
the right to globalisation is in largely in cultural terms while there is not much 
dissent, in the right, to the economic aspects o f globalisation, while the main 
concern o f the left, which is by its nature internationalist, is the economic 
dimension o f globalisation, basically the domination o f capital against immobile 
and fragmented labour, and the power of deregulated finance capital which can 
even dictate their priorities to political agencies.
Giddens’ degree of the uncritical thinking is such that, on the future 
of the global governance, he offers the integration o f the World Trade 
Organisation, IMF and the World Bank, after welcoming what these institutions 
have done by now (Giddens, 1998b: 151). He perhaps has no intention to 
reconsider what have been the social outcomes o f these institutions’ favoured 
policies all around the world.
Fortunately, there are still some others who both correctly perceive 
globalisation and do not surrender to orthodox formulations. For example Ethan 
Kapstein, in his search for a global third way, offers the multilateral regulation o f 
mobile capital which necessitates a global co-operation of political bodies, 
basically through taxation and enforcement o f social policy (Kapstein, 1999). Of 
the programs of the Bretton Woods organisations, he says that placing social 
welfare rather than the macro-economic stability at the centre o f every reform 
package would provide a useful corrective to their current way o f doing business. 
Meanwhile he is very aware o f the fact that such an attempt entails significant
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reforms within these organisations, not just in the countries they are meant to serve 
(Kapstein ,1999).
Perhaps the most interesting fact is that the Third Wayers 
unconditionally commit themselves to the orthodox rhetoric o f globalisation at a 
time when globalisation itself starts to be questioned even by the economic and 
political actors o f the global order. In the face of the recent economic crisis, having 
realised the rising instability and fragility of global balances which widely rest o f 
the domination of the finance capital, radical reform programs on the architecture 
of the global financial system are being proposed (See for example Sores'* The 
Crisis Of Global Capitalism, New York, Public Affirs, 1998; Mandel and Foust, 
How to Reshape the World Financial System, Business Week, 12 October,1998; 
Block, Controlling Global Finance, World Policy Journal, Fall, 1996; Stopford, 
Multi-National Corporations, Foreign Policy, Winter 1998-99; Smadja^, The End 
Of Slackness, Foreign Policy, Winter 1998-99).
A large number of economists today also accept that wrong macro­
economic choices, rather the macro-economic suspension and emphasis on supply- 
side, are highly responsible for the weaknesses of the domestic economies as a 
whole against the manipulations of finance markets (Naim, 1998).
In the second chapter we had stated that, in 1930, the first 
government experience o f the Labour Party under MacDonald proved to be a 
disaster since, having obsessed with demonstrating how moderate Labour was, the
George Soros is the owner o f the Soros Fund Management. 
 ^Claude Smadja is the director of World Economy Forum.
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government failed to fight the Great Depression. Then, Old Labour, which had 
drawn the essential lesson from this experience, could laid the foundations o f the 
post-war Britain in terms o f its own values. There may not be a Great Depression 
next door but we hope. New Labour, whose leaders, as put elsewhere, seem to have 
read nothing written before the 1970s, would not be remembered as the second 
MacDonald government.
As a final word to this chapter, perhaps not without justification one 
may say that by unquestionably committing to an fifteen years-old idea o f 
globalisation and macro-economic management. Third Wayers have already fallen 
behind, if  we use the term they like to much, the new realities. Perhaps this is the 
curse o f the new-right whose hegemony they successfully internalised.
143
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In this study, we started with a historical account o f the ideology o f British 
Labour party. This had two basic aims. First, to give an idea to the reader about the 
origins and the transformation of the ideology of parliamentary left in the twentieth 
century Britain (and Europe). Second, to be able to evaluate the current ideology o f New  
Labour that claims to continue this tradition by adopting it to new conditions.
Having founded as a mixture of trade union assumptions and a set o f  
groups interested in the articulation of socialist ideology, the Labour Party within a short 
time structured an ideology o f its own and took its place in British politics. The Party was 
far from being ideologically homogenous and throughout its history, the debate on the 
policy route of the party had never stopped. However, this debate was always on the 
question o f means while the ends, basically promotion o f equality and the creation o f an 
democratic and egalitarian society, were out of discussion. The whole ideological history 
of the party until the 1980s can be divided into two: First, pre-Keynesian i.e. labourist or 
corporate socialist ideology which finds its ultimate expression in old Clause IV. Second, 
Keynesian mixed economy and welfare state ideology which began to be developed in
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the 1930s and found its ultimate expression and realisation in the post-war British state 
and economy. The challenge of revisionism in the 1960s was not towards the principal 
values o f Labour’s ideology, it was basically towards the place o f public ownership, 
which was still kept as an idea embodied in Clause IV, but was not in the policy agenda 
of the party, since revisionists believed that post-war settlement had made public 
ownership unnecessary. In other words, when Crosland argued that public ownership 
could be put out o f the Labour’s agenda, the reason behind his offer was that 
modification of capitalism by Keynesian means had already solved the basic part o f the 
question precisely an egalitarian society in which distribution o f wealth was done fairly, 
and the post-war system could realise the goals of Labour. A strong welfare state was 
established, national health service was working, excessive power of the gigantic private 
capital was curbed, nationalised industries could run in favour o f the public interest, full 
employment was among the priorities, and various sorts o f benefits were distributed to 
those in need.
On the one hand, Crosland was right and post-war settlement, to a large 
extend, was fulfilling its objectives. But on the other, the basic weakness of the 
revisionist idea was that this settlement was regarded as infinite. The gro’wth o f the post­
war years led to the illusion that full employment and rising incomes were now 
guarantied. However, since the early 1970s, it had been realised that Keynesian 
economics proved to be inadequate to deal with the changing economic conditions. The 
crisis o f the late 1970s, which the Labour Government o f the era (Callaghan) moved to 
solve with an IMF loan, signified the end o f Keynesianism in Britain. Indeed the 
condition o f the crisis should not be understood alone as if  it was an objective reality that
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can be solved only by the new-right economics. However, combined with the power of 
the financial markets, in conjunction with the American state, to redefine the content of 
the debate over economic policy, there had been no reason for the new-right not to 
declare its practical victory (Thatcher government) as well as the end of theoretical 
debate, in the late 1970s.
Expectedly, the end o f Keynesian economics did not mean a simple 
change o f the tools of economic management. What was gone was also the 
redistributional and egalitarian socio-economic intentions embodied in welfare benefits, 
full employment, public services etc. The new right, both economically and politically, 
had nothing to do with those. All economic policy was sealed to a near mythical concept 
of macro-economic stability and free markets while deregulation released the logic of 
capitalist accumulation from the restrictions of the Keynesian welfare state within the 
Bretton Woods frame o f capital controls. A new and disastrous era was to come.
The last attempt to promote an alternative agenda which was neither 
Keynesian nor neo-liberal came from Labour’s New Left which we mentioned at the end 
of the first chapter. However following its defeat - which indeed occurred as a result o f  
the combination of many factors, the rising popularity o f Thatcher after Falklands 
victory, inability o f Labour to promote its case and policies, the unwillingness o f the 
right-wing of the party to take party in such an agenda, the division o f opposition votes 
caused by the SDP split, and the successful anti-propaganda o f the whole mainstream 
media - the stage was left to the new-right and another sort o f the left mainly consisted of  
those who find solution in accommodation to the principles o f the new settlement. And 
the story which began to be discussed in the third chapter is the story o f this
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reconciliation to the ideological hegemony of the new-right. At the beginning, under 
Kinnock, this was much imitative and lacking a sophisticated formulation while Kinnock 
also had to deal with organisational changes. However, under Blair, New Labour was 
able to promote a modified neo-liberalism with a package that appears as if  it is not neo­
liberalism, rather a modem social democracy. Nevertheless, as we tried to show 
throughout this study, this bright bundle, has neither anything to do with the left, nor does 
it mark a third way, rather it straightforwardly belongs to the right. Let us review why.
At its crudest, the left-right distinction is a theoretical matter. A matter o f  
principles and values, or as we stated elsewhere in this study, a metaphysical question of  
ought to. In introduction, we stated that the case of social democracy or democratic 
socialism is that if capitalism, which was originally regarded to be an unjust and inhuman 
system, can not be abolished, the goal should be the maximisation o f socialist goals 
within capitalism. This was possible only by behaving on behalf o f a set of values and 
trying to realise them at the largest possibility. Historian G. A. Cohen states that, 
equality and community used to stand as the basic values o f Labour as a democratic 
socialist party in Britain (Cohen, 1994: 7). They were the values distinguished Labour 
from other parties at Westminster, and indeed, they were simply the values which the 
Left issued as a matter of principle and the right rejected as matter of principle. 
Meanwhile, Cohen adds, the moral force o f these values never depend on the social force 
supporting them since anyone who believes them believes them because she thought 
them inherently authoritative (Cohen, 1994: 7). What was swept by New Labour and the 
Third Way are exactly these distinctive values of the Labour Party in particular, and the 
democratic left in general. New Labour replaces equality with equality o f opportunity (or
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opportunity for all) which indeed has been one of the key terms of those who used to take 
place anywhere other than on the left in history.
The notion of community is perhaps unluckier even than that o f equality 
since under New Labour the same term was filled with a totally different content. 
Especially in British context, community would refer to an occupational or socio­
economic association. Considering the historical fact, the Tories, who stress an ordered 
society, have never articulated their agenda in terms o f community since it belonged to 
another political tradition, would be enough to see this perception o f community is alien 
to Labour. If we come to the specific context of this word in Labour’s tradition: “I mean 
by community”, says Cohen, “the anti-market principle according to which I serve you 
not because o f what I can get out of doing so but because you need my service” (Cohen, 
1994; 9). As we tried to show in above pages, New Labour does not only empty this 
substance but also fill it with what the Tories would like to mean by different tenns. In 
this regard, the argument of New Labour that their notion of community serves to the 
idea o f socialism (Wright, 1996: 140), or Blair’s claim that the Third Way also marks a 
third way within the left as well as between democratic socialism and liberalism (Blair, 
1998; 1) are not only meaningless but also hypocrisy.
Let us now focus on the political practice and review the policy agenda o f  
New Labour and the substance of its offer. In brief, basic characteristics o f New Labour 
agenda are;
1. neo-liberal macroeconomics, low taxation, limited public spending
2. supply-side economic policies oriented towards training and labour 
enskillment
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3. unconditional acceptance o f the rules o f the global economy, basically 
the power o f financial markets
4. complementary relation between the state and market while the role o f  
the state is the assurance of the well functioning o f free market, and 
being responsive to the needs and demands o f the capital
5. flexible labour market conditions
6. welfare to work as a part of supply side economics
At the heart o f the agenda lies the belief that under the conditions o f global 
competition and free markets what is left to the government is not to focus on the demand 
side, or deal with the public initiative, but to prepare an attractive framework to the 
domestic and global capital by keeping markets competitive, taxes low, and provide 
skilled labour to the needs o f the capital and market. Supply-side economics is used as 
the general title for the whole project.
Indeed, the supply-side agenda is not completely new for the British left. 
The early Fabians, for instance, believed that socialism should also be in the business o f  
delivering a supply-side reform in order to expand output and increase ‘efficiency’. Or 
the technological enthusiasm and modernisation discourse o f the Wilson government can 
be interpreted in this rhetoric. Moreover, the Alternative Economic Strategy o f the New 
Left did also emphasised supply-side developments as a part o f its overall agenda 
(Thompson, 1996; 42). However, although all these policies were interested in the 
supply-side -  while they did not stuck on it alone - in order to achieve economic progress 
whose outcomes would run for a more successful realisation o f the goals o f the party i.e.
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transformation o f unequal socio-economic relations within society, under New Labour, 
supply-side is oriented towards the fulfilment o f the necessities of global capitalism. One 
can reasonably argue that there is nothing inherently wrong in the enskillment and 
employment of people anyhow. This is right however, when New Labour’s supply-side is 
placed in its whole agenda including neo-liberal macroeconomics, flexible markets and 
restrictive union legislation, its offer, theoretically, does not go beyond the exploitation of 
the largest quantity of labour power with the lowest wages. Furthermore, when one adds 
into the scene another New Labour theme, conditionality o f rights in return of  
responsibilities, the complete meaning of the offer becomes “you either accept the job 
given to you under these conditions, or forget even the unemployment benefit which you 
had got until now because you are not fulfilling your responsibility.” Stripped o f all its 
colourful dress this is the New Labour order.
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